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Governing by Guidance: Civil Rights Agencies
and the Emergence of Language Rights
Ming Hsu Chen*
On the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this Article asks
how federal civil rights laws evolved to incorporate the needs of non-English
speakers following landmark immigration reform (the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act)
that led to unprecedented migration from Asia and Latin America. Based on a
comparative study of the emergence of language rights in schools and work-
places from 1965 to 1980, the Article demonstrates that regulatory agencies
used nonbinding guidances to interpret the undefined statutory term "national
origin discrimination" during their implementation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Their efforts facilitated the creation of language rights, albeit to different
extents in schools and workplaces. The Article highlights the use of guidances to
protect language minorities as a distinctive breed of civil rights law. It uses a
historic, yet understudied episode to illustrate an often used, sometimes con-
tested practice: governing by guidance.
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INTRODUCTION
The ink had barely dried on the Civil Rights Act of 1964' when govern-
ment policymakers realized that their efforts marked a beginning, not an
ending, in the pursuit of equality. A landmark immigration reform,2 only
one year after the Civil Rights Act, lifted national origin quotas and resulted
in dramatically increased Asian and Hispanic3 immigration. The changing
size and composition of this newcomer demographic - many of whom
were not proficient English speakers' - fueled advocates' claims that the
government needed to update its approach toward inequality.' Securing the
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
2 A succinct history of the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act, which revised the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act by lifting national origin quotas, and its resulting increase in Asian and Latin
American immigration appears in DAVID REIMERS, STI.L THE GOLDEN DOOR: THE THIRD
WORLD COMES To AMERICA 66-67 (1992). See also Phil Wolgin, Beyond National Origins:
The Development of Modem Immigration Policymaking, 1948-1968 (June 2011) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Berkeley) available at http://escholarship.org/uc/
item/1vr7k843#page-1, archived at http://perma.cc/B37B-Qk7V.
I While "Latino" tends to be the modem term for the racial minority group originating
primarily from Latin America, "Hispanic" more accurately specifies the ethnic group that is
identified by language for official purposes. See CLARA RODRIouEz, CHANGINo RACE: LATI-
NOS, Ta CENSUS, AND THE HISTORY OF ETHNicrry IN THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (2000). For
that reason, the term "Hispanic" is favored in this Article over "Latino." Alternative terms
that were used somewhat interchangeably in this time period include "Spanish-surnamed" and
"Spanish-speaking" minorities. Id.
Language policies addressed both non-English speakers and Limited English Proficient
("LEP") bilinguals, regardless of citizenship. While LEP is a technical term used by the
government and is more accurate, this Article uses it interchangeably with non-English speak-
ers for ease of use.
I Asian and Hispanic experiences of discrimination originate long before 1965, as do
grassroots activists' efforts to improve their conditions. Policymakers' responsiveness to those
grievances, however, escalated after the civil rights era. See John Skrentny, Policy Making is
Decision Making: A Response to Hattam, 18 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 70, 70 (2004) (describing
"sudden growth of law, regulations, and court decisions that established nondiscrimination
rights for groups that policymakers saw as disadvantaged"). But see Victoria Hattam, The
1964 Civil Rights Act: Narrating the Past, Authorizing the Future, 18 STUD. AM. POL. DEV.




"equal opportunity" long promised and now required by statutory mandates
was still a work in progress for African Americans, and now government
officials would need a fresh approach for language minorities.
Policymakers recognized that transforming the aspirations of civil
rights rhetoric into concrete solutions would require greater capacity. They
enlisted the resources of a newly assembled "civil rights state" that in-
cluded the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's ("HEW's")
Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission ("EEOC"). These civil rights agencies were tasked with
interpreting, implementing, and enforcing federal civil rights statutes. Policy
entrepreneurs' within these agencies - "white men in suits"' - puzzled
over how to adapt civil rights statutes to the needs of the new immigrants.
Asians and Hispanics faced many of the same barriers as African Ameri-
cans. They also faced language barriers. A high percentage of Asians and
Hispanics lacked the language skills to fully participate in mainstream insti-
tutions where English predominated, even if it was not the official lan-
guage.9 Compared to Canada or other immigrant-receiving nations, the
United States had little infrastructure and scant resources to help them inte-
grate into English-speaking institutions.10 In addition, generations of neglect
6 The term "civil rights state" refers to the regulatory apparatus that developed in the mid-
1960s to enforce civil rights. R. Shep Melnick, Courts and Agencies in the American Civil
Rights State, in THE POLITICS OF MAJOR POLICY CHANGE IN POST-WAR AMERICA 1 (Sidney
Milkis & Jeffrey Jenkins eds.) (forthcoming 2014).
' The term "policy entrepreneurs" has a long vintage. Adam Sheingate defines them as
"individuals whose creative acts have transformative effects on politics, policies, or institu-
tions." Adam D. Sheingate, Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American
Political Development, 17 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 185, 185 (2003). The bureaucratic extension
of civil rights to nonblack minorities specifically is described as the minority rights revolution
in JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2002).
8 John Skrentny uses this description to highlight agency officials as central actors in the
extension of civil rights to nonblack minorities, as opposed to grassroots activists. See
Skrentny, supra note 5, at 70. My policy narrative accords with Professor Skrentny's top-
down history, but recognizing the leadership role of bureaucrats does not suggest inappropri-
ately activist behavior. In a separate study of workplace agencies serving undocumented im-
migrants, I describe the professional and organizational mandates that motivated bureaucrats
as an alternative to the more politicized description of bureaucrats as activists. See Ming H.
Chen, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 227
(2012). The difference between the way I describe the bureaucratic entrepreneurs in the emer-
gence of language rights and those responding to undocumented immigration post-Hoffman
Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), is the political context of the time. The
1965-1980 time period that is the focus of this Article was infused with activism and that
activism was part and parcel of the regulatory state that developed alongside the public interest
law.
9 English is sometimes considered the de facto official language of the United States, even
though congressional bills and proclamations seeking to adopt it officially have failed at the
national level. See generally SANDRA DEL VALLE, LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES: FINDING OUR VOICEs 54 (2003).
10 Cristina Rodriguez describes the multiculturalist commitment of Canada and other im-
migrant-receiving nations as involving robust accommodation of language rights. See Cristina
M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of
Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 157 (2001) ("Mul-
ticulturalism can take the form of state support and protection of ethnic or religious prac-
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meant that some Asians and Hispanics lacked English language competency
despite years of residence in ethnic enclaves of cities."
Curiously, the effort to define civil rights protections as encompassing a
right to access government programs without regard to language ability
emerged without a single mention of the word "language" in the civil rights
statutes being administered. Instead, bureaucrats latched onto the undefined
terms "national origin" and "discrimination" to anchor language rights in
civil rights law.12 The term "national origin" existed in immigration laws
going back to the New Deal era,' 3 but the term was resurrected in agency
implementation of civil rights statutes. In a variety of guidances and policy
statements, agency officials interpreted vague statutory texts prohibiting na-
tional origin discrimination to include protections for immigrants and non-
English speakers. They also interpreted "discrimination" to require more
than the right to formal equality - to agency officials, a robust recognition
of language rights required affirmative action to overcome language barriers
that impeded substantive equality. In both schools and workplaces, policy
entrepreneurs within agencies argued that the achievements of the black civil
rights movement eluded Asian and Hispanic language minorities. Language
gaps and institutional neglect isolated these language minorities from the
institutions critical to entering mainstream society.14 The result of agency
statutory interpretations was to clarify and concretize the rights of language
minorities; the means to achieve the result were guidances."
tices."). Canada is officially bilingual and commits significant government resources to the
maintenance of French and English in schools and public life as part of its commitment to
multiculturalism. Other immigrant-receiving nations (in Europe, for example) offer integra-
tion programs that include language instruction and cultural education to their newcomers.
The United States, in contrast, limits its language integration programs to refugees and K-12
schoolchildren, leaving other adult immigrants to seek out private resources. See CAROL
SCHMID, THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE: CONFLICT IDENTITY, AND CULTURAL PLURALISM IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 101-22 (2001).
" While not a well-known fact, five of the seven plaintiffs in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974), and the named plaintiff in Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), were native-
born racial minorities as opposed to recently-arrived immigrants. This litigation established
the parameters of bilingual education and English-only workplace policies. See infra section
IHI.D; see also Lau, 414 U.S. at 564; Gloor, 618 F.2d at 265; Reply Brief of Petitioners at 7,
Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172358.
12 Section 601 of Title VI reads "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). Section 703 of Title VII reads "[iut shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
" See generally MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING
OF MODERN AMERICA (2004) (providing an authoritative account of immigration history in the
1940s).
1
4 See infra Part III.
"' The use of the "rights" nomenclature in the regulatory context is often fraught with
modern debates over the scope and weight of protections announced in agency rules. In the
parlance of administrative law, substantive rights are typically issued in regulations produced
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The fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 offers an impor-
tant opportunity to reflect on an earlier moment when civil rights evolved to
accommodate new waves of immigration. This Article seeks to explain how
civil rights laws evolved to include immigrants and non-English speakers.
More specifically, it seeks to explain, first, how policy entrepreneurs in
agencies read an affirmative right to language access into civil rights stat-
utes. Their use of guidances and policy documents to clarify and concretize
statutory rights for national origin minorities is notable for several reasons.
As compared with community activists urging social movements in the
streets or public interest lawyers urging constitutional change through
courts, they employed obscure Federal Register notices and policy guidances
to achieve meaningful legal protection for a neglected group.
Second, this Article seeks to explain why the pathways to language
rights varied in schools and workplaces and the implications of those differ-
ences for the strength of language rights. While both the OCR and EEOC
interpreted the statutory term "national origin discrimination" broadly in
their guidances, the governing authority for these interpretations differed
dramatically. In schools, OCR officials initially sought to extend the prom-
ise of equal educational opportunity to non-English speaking students on
constitutional grounds; their claims evolved to base affirmative duties to ac-
commodate non-English speaking students on statutory and regulatory
grounds. This ambitious interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as imposing affirmative duties on schools to provide bilingual educa-
tion programs' 6 was upheld in the seminal Supreme Court case Lau v. Nich-
ols," codified by Congress in the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of
1974,11 and largely accepted in schools.19 In contrast, the EEOC more mod-
in accordance with notice and comment procedures specified by the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). A prominent test used to determine the validity, and thus the legally binding
effect, of a putative agency rule adopted without notice and comment procedures is the impact
on the substantive rights of the regulated entity. While the episode described in this Article
may raise questions taken up in this modern debate, this Article is not centrally concerned with
modem doctrine because such concerns are anachronistic. The term "language rights" is used
in this Article to refer to civil rights protections claimed by national origin minorities who
confront barriers to equal opportunity on the basis of their language ability. It encompasses
both legal claims (subject to administrative or judicial enforcement) and more rhetorical claims
with practical and political significance. See infra section I.B and text accompanying note 52.
'6 Although the programs sought by language activists are commonly referred to as bilin-
gual education, there are many styles of instruction that fall under the bilingual education
umbrella and there is little agreement on the most effective ones. In addition, while lay usage
refers to the curricular approach, legal usage shifts after the Lau v. Nichols case, once OCR
officials let stand the basic right of language access but stripped the specific remedy of bilin-
gual education. This history is further detailed in section III.C.
1" See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 564, 568 (1974) ("Any ability grouping or tracking sys-
tem employed by the school system to deal with the special language skill needs of national
origin-minority group children must be designed to meet such language skill needs as soon as
possible and must not operate as an educational deadend or permanent track." (quoting Identi-
fication of Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg.
11,595 (July 10, 1970))).
18 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1974).
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estly interpreted the Title VII prohibition against national origin discrimina-
tion as rendering suspect workplace policies that require employees to speak
English on the job. The EEOC interpretation met resistance in appellate
courts and hostility in workplaces.2 0
My explanation for how agency guidances transformed into stronger
language rights in education than in employment broadens modem adminis-
trative law's accounting of the value of regulation. It demonstrates the ways
agencies can use practically effective, yet legally nonbinding actions to pro-
tect the civil rights of minorities. Part I explains the framework and perspec-
tive of historical institutionalism as a lens for understanding the
phenomenon of agency-promulgated rights, contrasting it along the way
with modem understandings of agency guidances. Part II provides the back-
ground necessary to understand the expansion of civil rights and the social
science methodology used to construct comparative case studies to study it.
Part III presents two case studies that illustrate the use of guidances to elabo-
rate on statutory rights: the rise of language rights in schools and work-
places. Part IV abstracts elements of the case studies to set forth a theory of
governing by guidance. The Article concludes with reflections on how a
historic, yet understudied development can inform current understandings of
civil rights law and administrative practice.
I. INCOMPLETE AccouNTs OF CIVIL RIGHTs LAW
The puzzle that motivates this Article is the emergence of language
rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, absent statutory language specifi-
cally providing for them. The OCR and the EEOC advanced policy state-
ments and guidances interpreting these statutes to include concrete legal
protections for language minorities in the course of administering the na-
tional origin discrimination provisions in these statutes. OCR guidances led
'9 Section 1703(f) of the Equal Educational Opportunity Act requires school districts to
"take appropriate action to overcome language barriers . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012).
These actions vary from district to district, but they are predominantly analyzed under the
framework of Castafieda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981). "[T]he responsibility of
the federal court is threefold. First, the court must examine carefully the evidence the record
contains concerning the soundness of the educational theory or principles upon which the
challenged program is based . . .. The court's second inquiry would be whether the programs
and practices actually used by a school system are reasonably calculated to implement effec-
tively the educational theory adopted by the school .... Finally, a determination that a school
system has adopted a sound program for alleviating the language barriers impeding the educa-
tional progress of some of its students and made bona fide efforts to make the program work
does not necessarily end the court's inquiry into the appropriateness of the system's actions."
Id. at 1009-10.
20 The EEOC national origin guidance is discussed with more detail in section HI.D. See
OFFICE OF LEGAL CouNsEL, TiE VIIIADEA/EPA Drv., EEOC DIRECnIvEs TANSMn-AL
No. 915.003, SumEcT: EEOC CoMPIrANcE MANUL 15-8 (2006) ("In forbidding 'national
origin' discrimination, Title VII prohibits the denial of equal employment opportunity because
of the place of origin of an individual or his or her ancestors, or because an individual has the
physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.").
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to the inception of bilingual education in public schools, an ambitious regu-
latory undertaking that remains (albeit in an altered state) in Title VI law.
The EEOC provided for comparatively more limited prohibitions against En-
glish-only workplace policies in its national origin guidances. Again, the
legal edifice remains intact years later, but it is more contested. The ques-
tion is how these regulatory conceptions of language rights took hold, absent
statutory language clearly providing for them.
Legal accounts of civil rights law tend to focus on individual rights and
emphasize the role of courts in their creation. The predominant account of
civil rights as a case study for understanding the capacity of courts to effec-
tuate change, for example, features prominently the landmark Supreme
Court decision Brown v. Board of Education.21 Political scientists studying
policy change place it within its historical and institutional context,22 al-
though they tend to focus on Congress and the President. Each of these
accounts neglects regulatory agencies as institutional change actors and reg-
ulatory practice as a mechanism of change. To the extent that they do con-
sider agencies, they paint agencies as weak institutions subject to significant
political" or organizational2 4 constraints.25 However, the growth of the ad-
2' 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The vast literature discussing Brown is summarized in William
Manz, Brown v. Board of Education: A Selected Annotated Bibliography, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 245
(2004) and commemorated in fiftieth anniversary symposium issues of law reviews. For a
small sample of fiftieth anniversary legal scholarship, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM Jim
CROW TO CIVIL RiowTs: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
(2004); Derek Bell, The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y. L. ScH.
L. REv. 1053 (2004); David Garrow, "Happy" Birthday, Brown v. Board of Education?
Brown's Fiftieth Anniversary and the New Critics of Supreme Court Muscularity, 90 VA. L.
REv. 693 (2004); Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIsT. 92 (2004); William E. Nel-
son, Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, 48 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 795 (2003); and Jack B. Weinstein, Brown v. Board of Education After Fifiy Years, 26
CARDOzo L. REv. 289 (2004).
22 American Political Development ("APD") is the subfield of political science most con-
cerned with the history and development of institutions. For an influential account of APD
scholarship, see KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLM-
CAL. DEVELOPMENT (2004). Orren and Skowronek write: "[B]ecause a polity in all its differ-
ent parts is constructed historically, over time, the nature and prospects of any single part will
be best understood within the long course of political formation." Id. at 1. Of the several
strands of APD, historical institutionalism emphasizes "how institutions emerge from and are
embedded in concrete temporal processes" and offers ways of understanding dynamics of
institutional change and stability. Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative
Politics, 2 ANN. REV. POL. ScI. 369, 369 (1999); see also Theda Skoopol & Paul Pierson,
Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE
OF THE DISCIPLINE (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002).
23 See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agen-
cies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 440 (1989) ("An alternative means of achieving the policy outcome
... is to constrain an agency's policies through its structure and process by enfranchising the
constituents of each political actor . .. that is a party to the agreement to enact policy."); Terry
M. Moe, Power and Political Institutions, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 215, 221 (2005).
24 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organiza-
tional Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 6, 1531, 1533 (1992) ("The organiza-
tional changes . . . are responses to these specific mandates as well as to the general legal
2014] 297
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ministrative state under the New Deal and civil rights eras fundamentally
altered the ambition of regulatory policy. The first phase of regulation fo-
cused on economic regulation. 26 Subsequently, regulatory goals expanded in
depth and breadth to include rulemaking and regulation on civil rights, the
environment, and health and safety.27
Administrative law scholars examine agency power very carefully. Be-
cause of their emphasis on judicial review and doctrines of deference as the
fulcrum of the relationship between courts and agencies, however, they un-
derestimate the significance of regulatory claims that are not, strictly speak-
ing, enforceable in court.28 For example, the leading administrative law
treatise consists of three volumes, runs over a thousand pages, and spends
less than a single chapter discussing policy statements and guidances, dis-
cussing only their exemption from Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
rulemaking procedures for agency rules that carry the force of law. 29 The
same balance between rules and exceptions is kept in most administrative
law casebooks and administrative law courses. 0 The result of this uneven
environment."); Jodi L. Short, Creating Peer Sexual Harassment: Mobilizing Schools to
Throw the Book at Themselves, 28 L. & POLY 31, 32 (2006) ("[T]he constellation of profes-
sionals and organizations connected with them shap[e] both policy and law.").
25 Political scientists Shep Melnick and Paul Frymer and political sociologist John
Skrentny are exceptional in this regard. Professor Melnick, for example, demonstrates in mul-
tiple books that judicial interpretation was the key to implementation of welfare reform in
states and also civil rights policy. See R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING
WELFARE RIGHTs (1994); Melnick, supra note 6, at 33 (describing remedial model that
blended courts and agencies in enforcement of Title VI). Professor Melnick cites Paul Frymer
and John Skrentny as stating that, since the 1960s, the judiciary has "played a far more active
and affirmative role in building the powers of the state and expanding its power to regulate
civil society and the economy." Melnick, supra note 6, at 7 (citing Paul Frymer, Law and
Political Development, 33 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 789 (2008); and John Skrentny, Law and the
American State, 32 ANN. REV. Soc. 213 (2006)).
2 6 See generally CAsS SuNsTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE (1993).
27 Id.
28 Attention to judicial deference has jumped since the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), distinguishing the levels of deference
afforded legislative and nonlegislative rules. See, e.g., David Franklin, Legislative Rules, Non-
legislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276 (2010). The core ques-
tions in the post-Mead era are also represented in the scholarship of the 1990s that seeks to
describe and evaluate the muddled distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules.
See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A Harder Look at
Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 667, 668-69 (1996) (criticizing judicial
deference to policy statements to the same extent as regulations as a "profoundly unsound and
dangerously antilibertarian practice"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 ADmIN. L. REv. 59, 83 (1995) ("[I]t is now at least arguable that: (1) courts
accord greater deference to policy statements and interpretive rules than to legislative rules
and; (2) in important contexts, interpretive rules and policy statements bind judges and the
public to the same extent as do legislative rules.").
29 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2002) (chapter six
references guidance only indirectly as an exception to the APA rulemaking procedures).
3 0 The same pattern is seen in other leading administrative law casebooks. See, e.g., STE-
PHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CAsS R. SuNsTEIN, ADRIAN VERMEULE & MICHAEL
HERTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLIcY (7th ed. 2011); WIL.LIAM F. FUNK,
SIDNEY A. SHAPRo & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE (4th
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coverage is an impression that agency guidances are an insignificant legal
topic, despite their prevalence and import in the realm of administrative
practice. In administrative practice, a nonbinding rule with the power to
shape industry practices and inform the general public matters very much.
This Article sweeps more broadly than administrative law. It also de-
marcates more precisely than social science the mechanisms used by agency
officials to innovate using existing civil rights statutes. The Article's inten-
tion is to draw attention to agency issuance of nonbinding guidances as a
distinctive breed of civil rights law. While the prevalence and importance of
guidance documents have grown only in recent years, the Article illuminates
the civil rights era as a historical moment when the nascent practice of gov-
erning by guidance was used to great effect. In the case studies of both
schools and the workplace, regulatory agencies implementing civil rights
statutes articulated institutional obligations to provide language access in
their guidances and policy statements. Without resorting to formal pathways
for legal change, they effectuated meaningful protections for a neglected
group that, over time, have retained practical and normative significance.
The rights they announced were not born from thin air. Nor were they
merely ripples of other rights expansions. Unlike other civil rights develop-
ments, for example, these agency actions did not expand existing theories of
civil rights to new groups by amending a statute nor did they codify judi-
cially created theories of legal liability to implement statutorily created
rights.3' Agencies instead embedded their pronouncements of language
rights in statutes and then developed them through nonbinding rules in order
to derive legal and moral authority. Bureaucrats used guidances to enact
meaningful rights to language access that could be invoked against schools
and workplaces during administrative enforcement, even if these rights
lacked the full force of law accorded regulations in courts. Interestingly,
bureaucrats accomplished this feat in a legal environment not yet overtaken
by the preoccupations of modern administrative law: judicial review and
doctrines of deference. Muddling their way through the policy thicket, agen-
cies made legal rights "real" in the administrative state, to borrow language
ed. 2010); KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(2010). But cf LISA SCHULTz BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN & KEVIN M. STACK, THE REGU-
LATORY STATE (2d ed. 2013) (takes into account the broader political context); JOHN F. MAN-
NING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION (2d ed. 2013) (same).
3 Affirmative action and sexual harassment are frequently cited as judicially created theo-
ries of legal liability. On the development of affirmative action, see generally ANTHONY S.
CHEN, THE FIFTH FREEDOM: JOBS, POLITICS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1941-1972 (2009); HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972 (1990); and JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AF-
FIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1996). On sexual
harassment law, see generally CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979) and Catherine MacKinnon, Logic of Experi-
ence: Reflections on the Development of Sexual Harassment Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813 (2002).
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from Professor Charles Epp's aptly titled Making Rights Real.32 The theory
of policy innovation and regulatory rightsmaking advanced in this Article
builds on this richer account of administrative law.
A. Agency Statutory Interpretation and Nonbinding Guidances
The process of policy innovation, or what this Article terms governing
by guidance, can be viewed as a long arc with at least three phases: (1)
enactment of legislation, (2) statutory interpretation in the development of
regulatory policy, and (3) implementation and enforcement as agency-
promulgated rights. Agencies are critically involved in both statutory inter-
pretation and implementation. 3 Authority to interpret statutes may be dele-
gated, or denied, to agencies either implicitly or expressly. Agencies that
possess the authority to interpret statutes, while focused on text and guided
by legislative history and established canons, engage in a creative process
that goes beyond "rule articulation."3 4 Interpreting existing civil rights laws
as encompassing language rights required civil rights agencies to engage in
several interpretive leaps. The doctrinal "hook" for these interpretive leaps
came in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Like many laws enacted
during the 1960s, Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act contained broad
language, lending themselves to textual ambiguities and even contradictions
born of political compromise."5 Famously, the civil rights statute does not
even define "discrimination." 6 The nondiscrimination clauses then refer to
3See CHARLES Epp, MAKING RIGHTs REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREA-
TION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 2-4 (2009). Epp describes 1970s reforms in police miscon-
duct, sexual harassment, affirmative action, and playground safety as taking on a law-styled
attempt to bring bureaucratic practice in line with emerging legal norms.
33 See Abbe Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation, 121 YALE L.J.
534, 537 n.2 (2001) ("By many accounts, 'implementation' is the new interpretation, or at least
a very substantial part of it.").
' SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUTTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 165 (2010) (describing agency function as "rule articulation"). Others
have also noted the interpretive aspects of statutory implementation. See, e.g., William Es-
kridge & Kevin Schwartz, Chevron and Norm Entrepreneurship, 115 YALE L.J. 2623, 2624
(2006) (describing the exercise of agencies filling in the details of statutes as normative rather
than value neutral); Abbe Gluck, supra note 33, at 537 (arguing that some "federal statutory
interpretation . . . takes place not in the courts, but on the ground, by the state governors, state
legislators, and state administrative officials whom Congress increasingly places on the front
lines in the implementation - and so by necessity, the interpretation - of federal statutory
law"); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) ("[Algencies charged
with applying a statute necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices.").
3s Title VII is cited for its complexity in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY &
ELIZABETH GARRET, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38 (2d ed. 2006) ("The
most complex, and the most often litigated, portion of the Civil Rights Act has been Title
VII.").
36 Section 601 of Title VI reads "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). Section 703 of Title VII reads "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
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the protected category "national origin" without defining the term and with-
out explaining how national origin differs from potentially overlapping cate-
gories like race, ethnicity, country of origin, and citizenship.37 How the
regulatory agencies were supposed to implement the prohibition against na-
tional origin discrimination was unclear based on the plain language of the
statutory text. It would require interpretation, elaboration, and even innova-
tion in the course of implementation. The tools available to agencies to ac-
complish these critical tasks during the civil rights era were not well defined,
even if categories of rulemaking existed on the books. A comparison of the
theoretical and practical agency tools ensues.
B. Administrative Law on the Books
In the parlance of modem administrative law, agencies engage in
rulemaking as a way to interpret and implement statutes.38 Two forms of
agency rulemaking are provided for under the APA39: formal rulemaking and
informal rulemaking. Formal rulemaking adopts trial-like procedures.40 In-
formal rulemaking, also known as notice and comment rulemaking, emulates
the legislative process by commanding public input and agency delibera-
tion.41 Rulemaking "is the product of an exercise of delegated legislative
power to make law through rules." 42 For the purposes of this Article, I de-
fine guidances as all agency statements clarifying a legal position that are
not required to undergo the formal rulemaking or notice and comment
rulemaking procedures. Guidances encompass "interpretive rules" and
"general statements of policy." 43 While the APA's list of excepted rule types
is not further defined within the APA, the working definition that many
judges consult says that interpretive rules "advise the public of the agency's
construction of a statute" and that general statements of policy "advise the
public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Id. § 2000e-2.
3 Id. §§ 2000d, 2000e-2.
" The APA's general definition of "rule" encompasses "the whole or part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, inter-
pret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure or practice require-
ments of an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). Agencies may also, through adjudications,
interpret their own statutes and regulations. Adjudications, however, fall outside the scope of
this Article.
39 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596.
4 Id. §§ 556-557. Because formal procedures were not used in the creation of language
rights, such procedures are not discussed in this Article.
41 Id. § 553.
42 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:8, at 36 (2d ed. 1979).
43 While the APA requires that "[gleneral notice of proposed rulemaking shall be pub-
lished in the Federal Register," general policy documents are collectively grouped under an
exception that states: "Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection
does not apply to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
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a discretionary power."" Although not specifically mentioned in the APA
exceptions, guidances can also take the form of Dear Colleague letters,
memoranda of understandings, compliance manuals, and even press releases
setting out agency positions. Collectively, guidances constitute a major
form of regulatory action in the modem state. They are the primary focus of
this Article.
Agencies can generally choose from a variety of vehicles through
which to promulgate rules and/or guidances - formal rules, informal rules,
statements of policy, position statements, etc. Each vehicle carries a varied
amount of legal significance. For example, if a validly promulgated rule is
considered binding, the agency can cite to it as binding when challenged by
a regulated entity. If it is not considered binding, the agency needs to estab-
lish the basis for its reasoning or borrow from the authority of underlying
statutes and case law. However, even to this day, there is no bright line test
to establish whether courts will consider an agency's promulgation binding,
so it is challenging for an agency to determine accurately, from the outset,
whether courts will allow an agency to cite a promulgation as binding when
challenged.
C. Administrative Law in Action
This initial account of agency rules demonstrates considerable doctrinal
complexity and confusion. But the doctrine is yet more complex. For exam-
ple, courts have crafted a distinction between "legislative" and "nonlegisla-
tive" rules, which determines whether a rule must follow the APA's notice
and comment rulemaking procedures or is exempt.45 The doctrine provides a
variety of tests to determine whether a rule is legislative or nonlegislative:
the substantial impact test,46 the legal effects test,47 and others.48 However,
each of these tests can cut differently when applied to a particular instance.
In theory, once a singular test is agreed upon, the distinction between legis-
lative and nonlegislative rules would become clear. In practice, however,
" Tom C. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERALS MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
Acr pt. 3, § 4 (1947). For a more recent definition of interpretive rules, see American Mining
Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration, 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993). This case
found that a rule is "legislative," not "interpretive," if the answer to any of the following
questions is yes: "(1) whether in the absence of the rule there would not be an adequate
legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency action to confer benefits or ensure the
performance of duties, (2) whether the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal
Regulations, (3) whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative authority, or
(4) whether the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule." Id. at 1112.
45 See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Am. Postal
Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
"See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir.
1984).
47 See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112.
41 See William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN L. REV. 1321, 1324-25
(2001) (suggesting a procedural test for whether a rule is legislative or nonlegislative).
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applying the tests is extremely difficult and even a single test can cut differ-
ent ways. This is partially because, ex ante, agencies do not always clearly
characterize their issuances as legislative or nonlegislative, and do not often
make clear at the outset their intentions to bind the regulated entity or the
public through their issuances. Additionally, during implementation and af-
terwards, courts can decide that an agency's issuance is an invalid legislative
rule - a document issued without notice and comment procedures that in-
tends to bind courts or the agency in future actions. Such issuances over-
state the legal effect of the document. 49 These errors and omissions are
exacerbated when an important reality is confronted: guidances can have
practical effect, even if they lack legal effect as a formal matter. As Profes-
sor Robert Anthony explains, "A document that was not issued legislatively
[via notice and comment rulemaking procedures], and which therefore can-
not be binding legally, is nevertheless binding as a practical matter if the
agency treats it as dispositive of the issue it addresses." 0 For example, a
guidance may be treated as if it imposes mandatory standards in an enforce-
ment action, or may effectively impose such standards through regular appli-
cation of the standards set forth in the document.
Modem courts and commentators reflecting on these practical difficul-
ties have declared the doctrine "tenuous," "baffling," and "enshrouded in
considerable smog."5 Given that the contours of administrative law were
still taking form in 1970,52 the precise mode of rulemaking undertaken to
implement the Civil Rights Act was even murkier than would be the case
today. Rather than adhering to well-settled case law," agencies followed
instinct and intuition. By and large, agencies encountered these practical
realities without self-consciousness about the legal consequences that would
follow. The agencies set out to solve the problems entrusted to them by
statute through their regulatory toolkit. The choices they made - adminis-
49 See Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432 (Jan.
25, 2007) ("Because it is procedurally easier to issue guidance documents, there also may be
an incentive for regulators to issue guidance documents in lieu of regulations."). But cf Conor
Raso, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J.
782, 813 (2010).
SO Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Manuals and the Like -
Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311, 1312 n.l (1992).
Professor Anthony goes on to argue that such issuances that lack legally binding effect yet are
practically binding should be invalid. Id. at 1312.
s' These negative descriptors were used in American Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d
1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); and Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
52 While Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), providing the main alternative to
Chevron deference, had been on the books since 1944, it was not well integrated in the frame-
work for judicial review of agency issuances until 2001. Thus, it is not surprising that it would
not have been invoked in the language rights cases involving agency guidance during the
1970s-80s. See also supra note 15.
5 Today, Chevron and Mead specify norms that take into account the form of regulatory
action in determining whether the agency's intentions and procedures demonstrate sufficient
deliberation to merit judicial deference. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001).
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trative law in action - are elaborated in comparative case studies after a
brief discussion of the methodology used to construct them in Part II.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Studying policymaking as an unfolding process recognizes the impor-
tance of contingency, timing, and sequencing in the development of law and
legal institutions. My decision to study historical antecedents to contempo-
rary language policy challenges the perceived inevitability of those policies.
Studying policies that originate in regulatory agencies provides a fresh per-
spective on enduring questions about the civil rights era, which is more com-
monly viewed as the paradigmatic instance of rights-based legislative and
judicial change. The study attempts to reconstruct the policy pathways lead-
ing from the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and elimination of na-
tional origin quotas in immigration law one year later, through critical
moments in the policy implementation process, to the promulgation of
agency guidelines on language rights.54
A. Comparative Case Studies
These process-tracing histories set up a "testing ground" for a theory;
they are not just the "raw material for compelling narrative."15 Toward that
end, I use a structured comparison of two case studies and counterfactuals to
illuminate differences in the processes of policymaking that produced lan-
guage rights in schools and workplaces. The use of strategically selected
case studies provides perspective on the scope of the phenomenon described
and insight into the conditions under which regulatory rulemaking might
lead to stronger or weaker rights.5 6
By way of qualification, in both education and employment, I studied
federal civil rights laws that were the main vehicles for change during the
1960s-70s. The choice to omit state laws that were assuredly influential 7
admittedly has its tradeoffs, but it is appropriate given the distinctively fed-
eral character of legal change during this era. Plus, a methodological advan-
tage is that the study of federal policy promotes uniformity across the two
case studies: schools and workplaces.
5 See ALEXANDER GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 137 (2005). George and Bennett have defined a "causal mech-
anism" as the "processes through which agents with causal capacities operate ... in specific
contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities." Id.
" JACOB HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 65 (2002).
16 While the narratives were constructed to support sustained analysis across cases, this
type of qualitative research does not lend itself to hypothesis testing in the strict sense.
" Two examples of excellent scholarship on state-level civil rights include MARK BRIL-
LANT, THE COLOR OF AMERICA HAS CHANGED: How RACIAL DIVERSITY SHAPED CIVIL




Schools and workplaces comprise two sites that are especially worthy
of study given their prominence as equality-advancing institutions and their
centrality to immigrant integration. Further, the OCR and the EEOC, which
administer the Civil Rights Act's provisions on schools and workplaces re-
spectively, shared many traits during the emergence of language rights that
make them comparable, or "most similar" in methodological parlance.
They each administered key provisions of the same Act, operated in similar
political environments marked by openness to change, and employed similar
legal strategies.
However, differences in the agencies' institutional designs and in the
policy arenas in which they regulate provide important contrasts." Most
obviously, the OCR regulates public schools under Title VI, whereas the
EEOC regulates private businesses under Title VII. In terms of institutional
design, a cabinet-level secretary directly accountable to the President leads
the U.S. Department of Education (the successor agency to HEW), while a
bipartisan commission leads the EEOC. The OCR uses mostly administra-
tive case processing whereas the EEOC relies heavily on private litigation
for law enforcement. The EEOC lacks substantive rulemaking authority
whereas the OCR has such authority. The last fact is the most relevant for
purposes of this study and requires further elaboration in the subsections
below.
1. OCR and Title VI Rulemaking.
By statute, the OCR implements Title VI of the Civil Rights Act in
public schools. Hugh Davis Graham calls Title VI "the great sleeper provi-
sion" of the Civil Rights Act." Although little attention was paid to it dur-
ing legislative debate, which focused on Title VII, Title VI would become
"by far the most powerful weapon of them all."6o The reason is that Title VI
actually consists of two implementation provisions, with the latter unlocking
the potential for enhanced agency capacity in the OCR.
Section 601 goes to the statutory purpose of the Civil Rights Act. It
states that "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of race, color or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
58 Christopher Bonastia calls this the "institutional home." CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA,
KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ATrEMPT To DESEGREGATE THE SUB-
URBs 6-7 (2006).
5 Hugh Davis Graham, Since 1964: The Paradox of American Civil Rights Regulation, in
TAKING STOCK: AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 187, 194 (Morton Kel-
ler & R. Shep Melnick eds., 1999).
' GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 83.
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Federal financial assistance." 61 It sets forth a carrot for entities receiving
public funds - including most public schools - to comply with Title VI.
In light of the enormous increase in federal aid to public schools, the attend-
ant possibility of terminating funding serves as a strong incentive to
compliance.
Section 602 authorizes federal agencies to issue rules explaining how
Title VI requirements apply to the particular programs they fund.62 These
agency rules can be interpretive or substantive in nature. By relying on
agency rules and procedures to effectuate the statutory purposes in section
601, section 602 ultimately provides an administrative alternative to litiga-
tion and an end run around the "painfully slow and costly process" 6 of
remedying desegregation in courts. In accordance with the APA, the choice
to exercise the rulemaking authority provided in section 602 is left to the
OCR.
2. EEOC and Title VII Rulemaking.
The statutory authority for rulemaking under Title VII differs from the
authority granted by Title VI in important respects. While the APA gener-
ally leaves agencies with a choice as to their form of rulemaking, in some
instances Congress can restrict an agency's rulemaking authority. This was
the case in Title VII with regard to the substantive rulemaking powers of the
EEOC. The only explicit delegation of rulemaking authority directs the
EEOC "from time to time to issue . . . suitable procedural regulations to
carry out the provisions of this subchapter."" As Professor Melissa Hart
explains:
To some extent, the Court's lack of deference to the EEOC is part
of a broader picture: The Court has established a bifurcated struc-
ture of administrative deference that leaves much of the kind of
61 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VI, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252; see
also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (2006).
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l; Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000)
("Each agency providing Federal financial assistance shall draft title VI guidance . . . .");
Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2, 1980) ("The Attorney General shall
coordinate the implementation and enforcement by Executive agencies of various nondiscrimi-
nation provisions of . . . Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.").
63 R. Shep Melnick, Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. Professor of Am. Politics, Bos. Coll., Paper
Prepared for Delivery at the Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting: The Great
Debate over the Civil Rights State 7 (Apr. 1, 2010), available at https://lapa.princeton.edul
uploads/2010-0405%2OMelnick%20Seminar%20Paper.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8GW-
SP5J.
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2006). Title VII does not require the EEOC to use notice and
comment procedures when issuing its procedural regulations. See Edelman v. Lynchburg
Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 n.7 (2002).
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interpretation that the EEOC most often engages in with the power
to persuade but not the power to control.6 5
The EEOC can, however, issue interpretive guidelines on substantive
matters of law,66 and its interpretations sometimes receive great deference. 67
For example, interpretive guidelines might have the power to persuade a
court if they demonstrate sufficiently compelling logic. Professor Rebecca
White observes that "since the mid-1970s, the agency has issued its interpre-
tive guidelines only after extensive study, notice and comment, and some-
times public hearings." 68 These are the kinds of factors that typically
persuade courts to defer to agencies. While reviewing courts have not taken
up the opportunity to endorse the national origin guidelines specifically -
due to the agency's lack of formal authority to issue substantive rules - the
EEOC invoked its delegated authority to issue interpretive guidelines when
promulgating its national origin guidelines. 69
As discussed in Part I and elaborated in section III.D,70 EEOC interpre-
tive rules can have a meaningful practical effect even if their legal effect is
somewhat limited.
C. Data: Archives and Interviews
For each case study, I examined public and private documents illustrat-
ing the social, historical, and political context of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and 1965 Hart-Cellar Act.71 Within these documents, I looked into statutory
interpretation and regulatory implementation, focusing especially on key
challenges to these regulatory constructions of statute-based rights in 1968,
61 Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 1937, 1937 (2006). However, Hart further states that the Court has been reluc-
tant to specify what level of deference it owes to EEOC interpretations. Id. at 1938. When it
does apply a settled deference standard, it more often than not finds the EEOC's interpretation
unpersuasive. Id. at 1938, 1941-42.
6 "The [EEOC] . . . does not have the authority to issue legislative rules that further
define the prohibitions of the discrimination contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It
can offer its construction of the statute (called interpretive guidelines), but those constructions
do not have binding legal effect." Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71
U. Cm. L. REv. 1383, 1387-88 (2004); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (granting EEOC
"authority from time to time to issue suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions
of this subchapter").
67 See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (citing Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971), for the proposition that EEOC guidelines "do
constitute '[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency,' and conse-
quently . . . are 'entitled to great deference"' (alteration in original)); Griggs, 401 U.S. at
433-34.
68 Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Pol-
icy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
51, 98 (1995).
69 See 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (2013) (citing Title VII as its source of authority).
70 Infra text accompanying notes 214-220 (discussing administrative enforcement and set-
tlement proceedings favoring plaintiffs on the basis of EEOC guidance).
1' Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
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1970, 1974, and 1980. Government records from federal repositories pro-
vided my primary source material on Congress's intended meanings for the
national origin provisions of Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. I found evidence about the shifting executive branch priorities that
shaped civil rights enforcement in the papers of the Presidents, cabinet sec-
retaries, and other policy elites in the Presidential Libraries of Presidents
Johnson,72 Nixon," Ford,7 4 and Carter."
My study of agencies was the most difficult part of this work: it re-
quired trips to the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and the individual
archives of the agencies to uncover largely unedited, unstudied events. My
legal analysis of federal court responses to these regulatory interpretations
focused on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Titles VI and VII; national origin
discrimination guidance in 1970, 1974, and 1980 (for the OCR) and in 1970
and 1980 (for the EEOC); and court cases reviewing those actions. Where
official records left gaps in the story of political development, I investigated
private archives of the persons and organizations, law review articles and
op-eds, legal briefs and policy papers, personal correspondence, and founda-
tion reports. In order to probe individual motivations of agency officials, I
conducted in-depth interviews with activists and regulatory officials who
had been active during the period of rights expansion (many of whom have
since retired from office).76
72 The Johnson Library (Austin, Texas) contained extensive files on the EEOC and some
material on the OCR. Leon Panetta, director of the OCR for Johnson, left significant files,
including research from Martin Gerry, his special assistant and the original author of the May
1970 memo on discrimination against national origin minority students discussed in Part InI
infra.
7 The voluminous Nixon archives are split between Yorba Linda, California and Wash-
ington, D.C., because of the Watergate litigation. I searched presidential and cabinet records
related to education, employment, Hispanics, Asians, civil rights, social protest, and known
controversies concerning agency regulation (e.g., busing, affirmative action, sexual harass-
ment). The combined records of the National Archives and Records Administration
("NARA") II (College Park, Maryland), the U.S. Department of Education (formerly the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare's OCR), and EEOC headquarters were needed to
construct the history of language rights, which almost never presented itself as a research
subject heading. Significant gaps in the record of Lau v. Nichols and Garc(a v. Gloor necessi-
tated additional inquiries to Federal Records Centers, NARA Regional Archives, and agency
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") and acquisition officers.
74 The Ford Library (Ann Arbor, Michigan) held presidential papers as well as files for
Director of OCR and Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Stanley Pottinger. The Ford
collection of Pottinger's papers held many of the missing documents from the Nixon era (on
file with author). Information about the Carter and Reagan administrations is from research
available on microfiche and published accounts (on file with author).
5 Civil rights scholars Hugh Davis Graham, Gareth Davies, and John Skrentny provide
extensive descriptions of sources from the Carter library. See GRAHAM, supra note 31;
SKRENTNY, supra note 7; Gareth Davies, The Great Society After Johnson: The Case of Bilin-
gual Education, 88 J. AM. HIsT. 1405 (2002).
76 For bilingual education, I interviewed: Ed Steinman, Attorney for Kinney Lau; Ling-
Chi Wang, Cofounder of Chinese for Affirmative Action and Associate Professor Emeritus,
U.C. Berkeley Ethnic Studies Department; Henry Der, Former Executive Director of Chinese
for Affirmative Action; Chris Ho, Senior Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society-Employment Law
Center; Angelo Ancheta, former Executive Director of Asian Law Caucus and Executive Di-
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III. CASE STUDIES: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN
CIvIL RIGHTS AGENCIES LEAD TO REGULATORY RIGHTS IN
SCHOOLS AND WORKPLACES
A. Background: The Civil Rights Act Meets Immigration Reform
The convergence of immigration reform with the Civil Rights Act of
1964 represented a critical juncture in American political development.77
The civil rights agenda that supported the expansion of rights to language
minorities was part and parcel of a growing national government and a re-
alignment of party politics." Following the assassination of President John
F. Kennedy, Democrats secured control over Congress in 1964.19 The Dem-
ocratic stronghold in Congress remained well into the 1970s, balancing the
moderating efforts of the Nixon Administration. 0 The Democrats partnered
with the White House to push an ambitious social agenda with civil rights as
its centerpiece." A liberal majority in the Supreme Court bolstered these
policy priorities.82 Consequently, the social climate was conducive to regu-
latory agencies that vigorously and creatively implemented civil rights
mandates.
Against the backdrop of the expanding civil rights state, the Hart-Cellar
Act of 1965 lifted national origin quotas that limited non-European immigra-
tion.83 Ironically, President Johnson said during the bill signing, "This is not
a revolutionary bill. It does not affect the lives of millions. It will not
restructure the shape of our daily lives . . . ." Robert Kennedy estimated
"for the Asia-Pacific Triangle . . . 5000 immigrants would come in the first
year, but we do not expect that there would be any great influx after that.""
Both statements proved wrong. The scope and scale of demographic change
rector of the Alexander Community Center at Santa Clara Law School; Paul Igasaki, former
Executive Director of Asian Law Caucus and former EEOC Commissioner; and Paul Gross-
man, Chief Civil Rights Attorney for the OCR. I also consulted oral histories and interview
transcripts of Leon Panetta and Martin Gerry from John Skrentny. For employment discrimi-
nation, I interviewed EEOC attorneys in the Office of General Counsel, the Office of Legal
Counsel, and the Executive Secretariat; and the staffs of Commissioners Paul Igasaki, Stewart
Ishimaru, and Cari Dominguez and Regional Director Bill Tamayo (specializing in national
origin, bilingualism, and Hispanic affairs).
" A critical juncture represents an important decision point in the development of policy
because two or more possible paths diverge thereafter. See PAUL PIERSON, PoLITIcS IN TIME:
HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SociAL ANALYSIS 134-35 (2004).
78 For a general history of the civil rights era that covers these events, see generally GRA-
HAM, supra note 31.
79 Id. at 163.80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
8 See REIMERS, supra note 2, at 80.
8 Id. at 84.
5Id. at 74.
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was unprecedented. By the late 1960s, "third world" immigration crested;
Asian and Latin American migration especially increased. 86
Liberalization of immigration policy exacerbated language gaps. While
language barriers preexisted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, high levels of
migration increased the percentage of non-native English speakers." The
need to bridge language gaps escalated during this period. The U.S. Census
Bureau reports that in a sample of 9.5 million people, the number of people
in the United States whose native language was an Asian language or Span-
ish approximately doubled from 1960 to 1970 (from 306,624 to 556,445 for
Asian languages and from 813,429 to 1,696,240 for Spanish).8 Sixty-nine
percent of non-native English speakers self-reported that they could not read
a newspaper printed in English well in 1980.9 Nearly 25% of Spanish
speakers rated themselves as speaking English "not well" or "not at all" and
nearly 30% of Chinese speakers reported similar difficulty with English. 0
These figures stand in contrast to the less than 10% of French and German
speakers who struggled with English.91 These language-proficiency levels
are the reason that this study focuses on Asians and Hispanics.
Although merely a snapshot of language ability, these descriptive statis-
tics illustrate the scope of the problem of language barriers in 1970. Due to
these language barriers, many non-English speakers were effectively ex-
cluded from mainstream institutions such as schools and workplaces and
86 Id. at 61, 92, 123. However, according to Professor Reimers, "Western Hemisphere
immigration was considerably less than it might have been without the numerical limit, but it
nonetheless exceeded that ceiling and was much above what the restrictionists wanted in 1965.
Despite the fall from 1968 to 1969, immigration rose after that date. In the 1970s about two
million persons entered from the Americas. In 1978 immigration reached a decade high of
262,542 or more than double the 120,000 figure." Id. at 124.
87 Professor Jim6nez attributes the resilience of Mexican ethnic identity, including the
desire to speak Spanish, to persistent in-migration to the United States. TomAs ROBERTO
JIMENEz, REPLENISHED ETHNICITY: MEXICAN AMERICANS, IMMIGRATION, AND IDENTITY 88-92
(2010).
"8 See Campbell Gibson & Emily Lennon, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign
Born: 1850-1990 tbl. 6 (U.S. Census Population Division, Working Paper No. 29, Feb. 1999);
U.S. DEPr OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON COUN-
TRY OF ORIGIN, MOTHER TONGUE, AND CrTzENSHIP FOR THE UNITED STATES 1-599 tbl. 193
(1973).
19 See PAUL SIEGEL ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE AND LINGUISTIC ISOLA-
TION: HISTORICAL DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 7 tbl. 2 (2001). The Census did not
ask about language proficiency until 1980, so this Article uses sample data from the 1970s and
1980s proficiency figures as the best available data. See Roberto Ramirez, Analysis of Multi-
ple Origin Reporting to the Hispanic Origin Question 16 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper
No. 77) ("The question on language spoken in the home was first used in the 1980 Census.");
Robert Kominski, How Good is How Well? An Examination of the Census English-Speaking
Ability Question 1 (unpublished paper presented at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American
Statistical Association) (describing the evolution of census language questions and attributing
the increased detail beginning in 1980 to the need to prove eligibility for government lan-
guage-assistance programs established in the 1970s).
' BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION: DETAILED POPULATION CHAR-




faced diminished chances for academic, economic, and political success.92
In essence, the on-the-ground realities of language barriers generated mate-
rial problems of inequality and fed feelings of isolation. Mounting dissatis-
faction, and rising hope over the potential of civil rights laws, led to a rights
revolution that included language minorities.
B. Redressing Language Barriers in Bureaucracies
In a break from past civil rights struggles, non-English speaking Asians
and Hispanics excluded from schools and workplaces took advantage of in-
stitutional channels to redress their concerns. In education, parents and stu-
dents invoked Brown v. Board of Education3 and Title VI in litigation
campaigns to challenge unfair school practices. They also participated in
government-sponsored task forces to oversee the implementation of regula-
tory guidance on national origin discrimination. In employment, the Mexi-
can American Legal Defense and Education Fund ("MALDEF') lobbied
Congress and the President for increased representation of Hispanics in
high-level jobs in both the public and private sectors and made brief appear-
ances during the public hearings attendant to the EEOC's notice of proposed
rulemaking on national origin discrimination.94 On the ground, frustrated
parents, students, and workers complained to independent agencies responsi-
ble for monitoring civil rights enforcement or the regulatory agencies di-
rectly responsible for enforcement.95 In response, agency officials launched
proactive investigations, set demanding compliance standards, and ramped
up enforcement - in essence, the administrative response transformed lan-
guage barriers into a legally redressable problem without resorting to legisla-
9 For more on the effects of language gaps, consult the resources of ethnic minority
groups such as the Asian American Justice Center and MALDEF. See, e.g., ASIAN AM. Jus-
TICE CTR. & MALDEF, LANGUAGE RIGHTS: AN INTEGRATION AGENDA FOR IMMIGRANT COM-
MUNITIES 13-17 (2008), available at https://www.maldef.org/resources/publications/
language rights-briefing-bookJune%202008.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NB25-X6M2
[hereinafter ASIAN AM. JUSTICE CTR. & MALDEF, LANGUAGE RIGHTs]; ASIAN AM. JUSTICE
CTR. & MALDEF, ADULT LrrERACY EDUCATION IN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES: IDENTIFYING
POLICY PRIORITIES FOR HELPING NEWCOMERS LEARN ENGLISH 22-34 (2007), available at
http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/IM3622H5009.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
Q26G-NMUX [hereinafter ASIAN AM. JUSTICE CTR. & MALDEF, ADULT LITERACY EDUCA-
TION IN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES].
9 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
94 See generally GARETH DAVIES, SEE GOVERNMENT GROW: EDUCATION POLITICS FROM
JOHNSON TO REAGAN 332 n. 19, 335 n.76 (2007); JULIE LEININGER PYCIOR, LBJ AND MEXICAN
AMERICANS: THE PARADOX OF POWER 164-68 (1997); Memorandum from Hector Garcia and
Carlos Vela in MALDEF Archives Box 156, RG 9 (Stanford Univ., Green Library, Dept. of
Special Collections M0673).
9 See generally DAVIES, supra note 94; Memorandum from Hector Garcia and Carlos
Vela in MALDEF Archives Box 156, RG 9 (Stanford Univ., Green Library, Dept. of Special
Collections M0673).
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tive action or amendment of the Civil Rights Act.96 The development of that
administrative response is the heart of this Article.
The remainder of this section presents two case studies in which policy
entrepreneurs expanded upon the text of a vaguely worded federal civil
rights statute to require language access for predominantly Chinese-speaking
and Spanish-speaking language minorities.97 The two case studies will
demonstrate that, in both schools and the workplace, agencies interpreted the
Civil Rights Act as including language rights within the scope of national
origin discrimination. However, differences with respect to judicial enforce-
ment and congressional action have resulted in much more robust language
rights in schools than in workplaces.
C. OCR Interpretation of Title VI National Origin Discrimination
Racial inequities in schools constituted the front line in the struggle for
equal opportunity during the civil rights era. Segregated schools that were
identifiably black or white posed the most glaring example of state-sup-
ported inequality. While less prominent in the national reform effort, similar
practices of racial segregation separated Mexican and Chinese children from
public schools. Moreover, subtle forms of discrimination and benign neglect
left many schoolchildren with limited English proficiency functionally sepa-
rate within schools that were not being monitored by courts. Expanding
notions of equal opportunity recognized that laws and policies that were not
overtly discriminatory could nevertheless result in disparate impacts on pro-
tected groups.98 Those who lacked language competency received deficient
education and would go on to be screened out from public services through
literacy requirements, skills tests, and untranslated forms necessary to access
public benefits. 9
The pivotal stage in the struggle for language rights in schools emerged
in San Francisco's Chinatown. Eventually, both the litigation and the agency
guidance that arose from the plight of Chinese immigrants in San Francisco's
schools would have a nationwide impact on language rights in education. In
San Francisco's Chinatown, Chinese students enrolled in the San Francisco
" In comparison, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, was formally
amended in 1970 to cover language minorities and provide for bilingual ballots. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (2006). The Voting Rights Act comparison is developed in other work. See, e.g., Ming
H. Chen, Regulatory Rights: Courts and Agencies Constructing "National Origin" Discrimina-
tion as Language Rights in Schools and Workplaces, 1965-1980, at 17-29 (June 2011) (un-
published Ph.D dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
9 The case studies draw significantly on material presented in my doctoral dissertation.
See Chen, supra note 96, at 38-51.
9 See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact, 49 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 125, 140, 143 (2014).
' See generally AsiAN AM. JusTicE CTR. & MALDEF, LANGUAGE RIGHTs, supra note
92, at 13-16; AsIAN AM. JUSTICE CTR. & MALDEF, ADULT LrrERACY EDUCATION IN IMMI-
GRANT CoMMUNrrEs, supra note 92, at 22-34.
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Unified School District ("SFUSD") suffered language isolation. Concen-
trated numbers of non-English speakers attended segregated schools in Chi-
natown or were lumped together in English-speaking classrooms with other
immigrants who spoke neither English nor Chinese.0'" Most were com-
pletely excluded from classroom instruction due to the unavailability of Chi-
nese-English bilingual education.' 0 There was enough dissatisfaction to
generate the 1970 filing of a lawsuit, now known as Lau v. Nichols,02
against the SFUSD and a parallel administrative response.
In response to linguistic isolation in Chinatown, Ed Steinman, a Legal
Aid attorney, brought litigation to challenge the SFUSD's language policies,
or the lack thereof, in the Northern District of California. His opening brief
characterized SFUSD's practices as benign neglect, not born of intentional
discrimination but nevertheless barring Chinese students from educational
instruction. It alleged that the denial of education on the basis of language
exclusion violated the Fourteenth Amendment, California's constitution, and
a number of city codes and school district policies. The brief's main innova-
tion on past equality law was the claim that ensuring equal opportunity re-
quired more than affording the same treatment for differently situated
students. Steinman argued that schools were responsible for taking affirma-
tive steps to accommodate these differences. 0
On May 25, 1970, the same year that Steinman filed the Lau litigation
in federal district court, the OCR released a policy guidance titled Discrimi-
nation Against National Origin Minority Students under the authorship of
Martin Gerry and Stanley Pottinger. '4 The OCR policy guidance outlined an
administrative response to national origin discrimination. The guidance
drew on accumulated evidence regarding the "systematic lower achievement
of minority group children and the existence of large numbers of segregated
ability-grouping and special education classes" 0 and endeavored to combat
"nSee L. Ling-Chi Wang, Lau v. Nichols: History of a Struggle for Equal and Quality
Education, in THE AsIAN AlvulcAN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A SOURCEBOOK FOR TEACH-
ERS AND STUDENTS 58, 62-66 (Don T. Nakanishi & Tina Yamano Nishida eds., 1995).
101 Id. at 59-60.
102 414 U.S. 564 (1974).
103 See Rachel F. Moran, The Story of Lau v. Nichols: Breaking the Silence in Chinatown,
in EDUCATION LAW STORIEs 111-57 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2007);
see also DAVIES, supra note 94, at 147-65 (citing Shirley Hufstedler papers from Carter Presi-
dential Library in Atlanta, Georgia); DEL VALLE, supra note 9, at 235-48; GARY ORFIELD, THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION 89 (1969); LEON PANETTA, BRING Us TOGETHER:
THE NIXON ThAm AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS RETREAT 335-56 (1971); SKRENTNY, supra note 7, at
179-229.
1'I Memorandum from J. Stanley Pottinger, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, Dep't of Health,
Education & Welfare, to School Districts with More than Five Percent National Origin-Minor-
ity Group Children (May 25, 1970), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/laul970.html, archived at http://perma.cc/K7Q8-6BTX. The memorandum was subse-
quently published in the Federal Register. Identification of Discrimination and Denial of Ser-
vices on the Basis of National Origin, 33 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (July, 18 1970).
1o Bilingual Education Act: Hearings Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Educ. of the Comm.
on Educ. and Labor, House of Representatives, 93rd Cong. (1974) (statement of Martin Gerry,
Acting Director, Office for Civil Rights).
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"common practices that have the effect of denying equality of educational
opportunity to Spanish-surnamed pupils" in breach of Title VI.106 The gui-
dance asked schools to develop and assess their own bilingual education
programs and required schools to take "affirmative steps" to open up their
instructional programs to language minority students wherever the "inability
to speak and understand the English language excludes national-origin mi-
nority group children from effective participation in the educational program
offered by a school district." 0 In defense of its authority to issue the guide-
lines, the OCR pointed to Title VI itself and the Fifth Circuit's announcement
that it would give "great weight" to the OCR's guidelines in United States v.
Jefferson County.0
According to Steinman, there was little coordination between Legal
Aid's strategy and the OCR regulatory response.'"0 Steinman became aware
of the OCR memo shortly before Lau was to be decided but after oral argu-
ments had closed. Although his recollection is vague thirty years later,
Steinman remembers a phone call from someone at the OCR that may have
alerted him that the memo, which had been in the works for more than a
year, would soon be issued."10 This account matches with unofficial ac-
counts from OCR regional attorneys in San Francisco and is consistent with
other accounts of the Lau litigation."' According to Paul Grossman (re-
cently retired Chief Civil Rights Attorney, but a young staff attorney at the
" Identification of Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis of National Ori-
gin, 33 Fed. Reg. at 11,595.
107 Id. The OCR guidance endeavored to combat "common practices which have the ef-
fect of denying equality of educational opportunity to Spanish-surnamed pupils" in breach of
Title VI. There were three main provisions: (1) "Where inability to speak and understand the
English language excludes national origin-minority group children from effective participation
in the educational program offered by a school district, the district must take affirmative steps
to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these students";
(2) children were not to be placed in remedial programs on the basis of language skills, and
any ability grouping connected with language deficiency "must be designed to meet ... lan-
guage skill needs as soon as possible and must not operate as an educational dead-end or
permanent track"; and (3) parents were to be kept informed of school activities through notifi-
cation "in a language other than English." Id.
108 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966). Jefferson was the culmination of judicial review
over a series of cases evaluating agency authority in school desegregation under Title VI.
'" Interview with Ed Steinman, Att'y for Kinney Lau, in S.F., Cal. (Nov. 4, 2008).
10 Id.
"' Although there is some contestation among scholars and activists about the ordering of
events, the overwhelming evidence suggests that bureaucrats played the pioneering role. Mar-
tin Gerry, a young attorney working for Leon Panetta in the HEW Office for Civil Rights in
1968, responded to community dissatisfaction with the classification of Spanish-surnamed stu-
dents as white for purposes of school desegregation. Gerry later claimed in congressional
testimony for the Equal Educational Opportunities Act ("EEOA") that the compliance review
"was in part prompted by complaints from community groups that the Office had failed to
investigate and identify discriminatory aspects of school district operations which often re-
sulted in the segregation of national origin minority children within schools and denial to them
of equal educational opportunity." Equal Educational Opportunities Act: Hearing on H.R.
13,915 Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 92nd Cong. 3 (1972); see also Interview
with Paul Grossman, Chief Civil Rights Att'y, Office for Civil Rights, Dep't of Health, Educa-
tion & Welfare, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 5, 2008).
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time), the language rights theory came from San Francisco and travelled to
national headquarters with Martin Gerry, Leon Panetta, and Stanley Pottin-
ger, who were all working within the San Francisco branch of the OCR.12 It
may have been mere coincidence that the San Francisco OCR office was
located just blocks from Steinman's Legal Aid office and that the OCR of-
fice got wind of the as-of-yet insignificant lawsuit. However and whenever
Steinman became aware of the imminent memo, Steinman takes responsibil-
ity for drafting the district court order and delayed filing it until the OCR
memo became public so that he could cite it as persuasive authority." 3
Eventually, the litigation-based and administrative challenges con-
verged on appeal. In the Ninth Circuit, the federal government intervened
on the side of the Lau plaintiffs because it had an interest in ensuring that the
SFUSD follow its Title VI guidance. 114 Although the government's Title VI
argument did not prevail in the Ninth Circuit, it would become a critical part
of the litigation strategy going forward. On appeal to the Supreme Court,
Steinman and Pottinger (now representing the OCR in his new position as
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights within the Department of Jus-
tice) split their oral argument into two parts. Steinman argued that SFUSD
practices violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Pottinger argued that they violated Title VI as interpreted by the
OCR." 5 At the urging of the Justices, statutory issues overshadowed the
constitutional ones during oral argument."' The OCR pleaded that the "de-
termination of the constitutional issue in this case need not control the dispo-
sition of the statutory question" because Title VI is "neither dependent upon
nor necessarily coincident with the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.""' The OCR then defended its regulatory authority in
several ways. First, the OCR built the case for agency deference by citing
prior instances in which agency rulemaking authority had been upheld."'
112 Interview with Paul Grossman, Chief Civil Rights Att'y, Office for Civil Rights, Dep't
of Health, Education & Welfare, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 5, 2008).
"3 Interview with Ed Steinman, supra note 109.
" See Reply Brief of Petitioners, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (No. 72-6520),
1973 WL 172358; Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lau, 414 U.S. 563
(No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172359; Brief for the Petitioners, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520),
1973 WL 172369.
"' Oral Argument, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), available at http://www.oyez.org/
cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_72_6520, archived at http://perma.cc/8E26-LUSA.
"6 See id.
" Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-
6520), 1973 WL 172359, at *14.
118 The petitioner's brief cites United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372
F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), a parallel lawsuit defending OCR's desegregation strategy, and Traf-
ficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). Brief for the Petitioners,
Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172369, at *47-48. Although neither OCR nor
the Supreme Court cite to Skidmore (the leading case on judicial deference to agency guidance
at that time) for their assertions of agency authority, they roughly follow its framework of
judicial deference. In this framework, the level of deference afforded an agency's interpreta-
tion of its enabling statute turns on: the thoroughness evidenced in its consideration, the valid-
ity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and "all those
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Second, it alluded to the origins of the OCR policy guidance in compliance
reviews as evidence of the agency's expertise in the matter."'9 Third, it justi-
fled its threat of cutting off funding to public schools under the statute itself,
specifically section 601 of the Civil Rights Act.120 The OCR's interpretations
of its own authority were backed by the National Education Association,
which stated in an amicus brief that the OCR "regulations have the force of
law."121
In response, the SFUSD conceded the factual record and argued their
good faith.122 They claimed to offer equal educational opportunities to En-
glish-speaking and non-English speaking students because their curriculum
was offered on the same terms and conditions.'23 Notwithstanding their
good faith efforts to serve non-English speaking students, the SFUSD argued
that neither the Equal Protection Clause nor Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
required the court to impose affirmative duties on the school district to pro-
vide "special assistance to children who do not speak English adequately" in
the absence of discriminatory intent.2 4 As opposed to state-created racial
discrimination, the school district characterized the case as involving "stu-
dents with a language difficulty which is directly related to the accidents of
birth - national origin, native tongue of parents, and exposure to ambient
verbal communications in other tongues than English. It is a difficulty not
of the school district's making." 25
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." See, e.g., EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)); see also supra notes 15 and 52.
"' Brief for the Petitioners, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172369, at
*45-46; cf Jorge Rangel & Carlos Alcald, Project Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in
Texas Schools, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 2 (1972) (detailing relationship between Chicano
segregation in Texas schools, compliance reviews, and May 25 memorandum).
120 Brief for the Petitioners, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172369, at
*44-45. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national
origin in any "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(2006).
121 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Childhood and Government Project in Support of Peti-
tioner Children, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172360; Brief for San Francisco
Lawyers' Committee for Urban Affairs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Lau, 414
U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172362; Brief of American Jewish Congress et al., Amici
Curiae, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172364; Brief of Amici Curiae MALDEF,
American G.I. Forum, League of United Latin American Citizens, Ass'n of Mexican American
Education, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172365; Brief for the National Educa-
tion Ass'n and the California Teachers Ass'n as Amici Curiae, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-
6520), 1973 WL 172366; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Center for Law and Education, Harvard
University in Support of the Petitioners, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172367;
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., in Support of
Petitioners, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172368.
122 Brief of Respondents, Lau, 414 U.S. 563 (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172357, at *1-2.
123 See id. at *4.
124 Id. at *9 ("This is the extent of the regulation's application. Should they be interpreted
to extend beyond regulating constitutional violations, then they have been adopted in excess of
the congressional delegation of authority and are invalid.").
125 Id. at *2.
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The Supreme Court sided with the students. "Under these state-im-
posed standards there is no equality of treatment merely by providing stu-
dents with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for
students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any
meaningful education."'26 The majority concluded, "Where inability to
speak and understand the English language excludes national origin minority
group children from . . . school[s], the district must take affinnative
steps ... to open its instructional program to these students."'27 With regard
to regulatory authority, the Court said, "By section 602 of the Act [the De-
partment of Education] is authorized to issue rules, regulations, and orders
to make sure that recipients of federal aid under its jurisdiction conduct any
federally financed projects consistently with section 601."l28 Without ques-
tioning whether the Department of Education acted pursuant to its substan-
tive rulemaking authority when issuing its guidelines,129 the Supreme Court
deferred to the OCR's substantive interpretation of Title VI as requiring an
affirmative effort to accommodate non-English speaking students.
The reception to the OCR's policy guidance was overwhelmingly,
though not uniformly, positive. As to legal effect, the initial guidelines on
national origin gained strength through their positive reception in courts and
by Congress. Congress's subsequent codification of Lau in the Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity Act of 1974130 reinforced the Supreme Court's findings
and, by extension, the OCR. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Serna v. Por-
tales Municipal Schools'"' followed Lau in the same year. In terms of practi-
cal effect, the regulatory strategy was also quite successful. Continuing with
its regulatory boldness, the OCR's follow-up to the Lau litigation was a
memo designed to describe appropriate remedies that would satisfy the Su-
preme Court's Lau mandate. 3 2 While no specific remedy had been urged by
126 Lau, 414 U.S. at 566.
127 Id. at 568 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
128 Id. at 567. Section 601 gives the Department of Education authority to promulgate
regulations prohibiting discrimination in federally assisted school systems. Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VI, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252.
129 This second inquiry would be required today under Mead, which asks not only whether
Congress delegated rulemaking authority to the agency but also whether the agency intended
to use it. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001). In response to the first
inquiry, the Court correctly noted that Congress delegated to the OCR substantive rulemaking
powers under section 602 of Title VI. As a practical matter, however, it is not entirely clear
that the OCR intended to use its rulemaking authority to enact the guidance. The OCR first
engaged in extensive factfinding. Based on that factfinding, it made bold statements about
what Title VI required for successful implementation: the right to access public education
through the integration of non-English speaking students into mainstream classrooms, the de-
velopment of transitional language courses, and bilingual-bicultural curriculums that maintain
and even promote minority languages. But the OCR never engaged in notice and comment
rulemaking, and in their briefs to the Supreme Court they relied directly on section 601.
130 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2012).
'' 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (1974) (stating that, under its inherent equitable power, a court
could properly establish a program for elimination of discrimination).
132 See Memorandum from William L. Smith, Acting Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights,
Dep't of Educ., to OCR Senior Staff (Apr. 6, 1990), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/
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the Lau plaintiffs or ruled upon in the Supreme Court litigation,133 the OCR
remedies became the de facto compliance standards and bilingual education
became the favored approach for remedying national origin discrimination
for non-English speaking students. Within the first year after the litigation
commenced, the OCR opened compliance reviews in thirty districts in vari-
ous states based on possible violations of its 1970 compliance guidance.'3
The second OCR memo specifying bilingual education as the remedy
for national origin discrimination fared less well. Opponents of bilingual
education disagreed with the federal government's intrusion into the regula-
tion of local schools more than they disagreed with the philosophy of bilin-
gual education.' 3  Emblematic of this resistance, Regulation magazine
opined:
Providing such special treatment for some of our disadvantaged
fellow citizens is, in many cases, unquestionably sound social pol-
icy; but doing so under the guise of constitutional or statutory pro-
scriptions against "discrimination" has considerable cost. It
cheapens the currency of constitutional rights; it removes a large
number of social judgments from the political process and entrusts
them to the federal bureaucracy or the courts; and it tends to pre-
vent needed flexibility . . . .16
An unpublished lawsuit' challenging agency authority to install bilingual
education through an informal memorandum prompted the OCR to publish a
offices/list/ocr/docs/laul990_and_ 1985.html, archived at http://perma.cclWC55-3P3W
(describing the purpose of the post-Lou memorandum titled Task Force Findings Specifying
Remedies Available for Eliminating Unlawful Discrimination under Lau v. Nichols (1975)
(available at National Archives Pacific, San Bruno, Cal.)).
m The Supreme Court accurately declared that "no specific remedy [wa]s urged upon
[the Court]," Lau, 414 U.S. at 564, and remanded to district courts for determinations of the
instructional strategies that ought to be used to protect language minorities, id. at 569.
134 See U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, HEW NEws, May 25, 1972, HEW-B78, at
2-3 (mentioning thirty ongoing OCR compliance reviews and noting that ten districts began to
take remedial actions after negotiating with OCR). The issued guidance summarizes the com-
pliance review process. Identification of Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis
of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (July 18, 1970).
135 An education report in the National Journal explains Congress's delay of the issuance
of formal regulations until the Reagan Administration took office: "The argument isn't over
the right of the children to learn. It isn't even over the best way to teach them, although there
are substantial disagreements on that score. The fight is about local control of education and
the extent of federal authority to regulate what goes on in the classroom." Rochelle L. Stan-
field, Inst. of Governmental Studies, Education Report: Are Federal Bilingual Rules a Foot in
the Schoolhouse Door, 12 NAT'L J. 1736 (1980).
i36 An issue of Regulation: AEl Journal on Government and Society included a staff edito-
rial criticizing the development of bilingual education. The op-ed states in its opening para-
graph that, "Whatever the merits of the current [bilingual education] proposal as policy, its
presentation as a civil rights measure deserves a closer look in itself, because that reveals some
of the more general problems associated with the elaboration of civil rights regulation in recent
years." Editorial, Bilingual Education: The New Accent in Civil Rights Regulation, 4 REG. 5,
7 (1980).
37 Complaint, Nw. Arctic Sch. Dist. v. Califano, No. A-77-216 (D. Alaska, Sept. 29,
1978) (described in internal memoranda of OCR held in NCLR Archives, Stanford University
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notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM") that would replace the unofficial
OCR remedies memo, presumably to strengthen the procedural safeguards in
an increasingly judicialized climate.'"3 The NPRM proposed bilingual edu-
cation as the required method of instruction in schools with the requisite
number of national origin minority students. These rules, however, never
came into being because the NPRM was withdrawn once President Reagan's
Secretary of Education took office and found the proposed rules to be intru-
sive on state and local authority.'39 OCR put into effect nonprescriptive
compliance standards that required the agency to evaluate school districts on
a case-by-case basis.
The OCR policy guidance and compliance strategy remain in effect to-
day. While the legal principle initiated in the 1970 guidelines and then buf-
fered in Lau v. Nichols and the EEOA remains good law, the remedy of
bilingual education provided for in the internal memorandum was somewhat
eroded by the subsequent legal precedent. A Fifth Circuit case, Castadieda v.
Pickard,140 lowered the burden on school districts to demonstrate that their
educational plan could meet regulatory standards for compliance.'14 Cas-
tafieda cuts back on the practical effect of OCR regulation by granting
school districts wider discretion to choose curricular alternatives to bilingual
education. What is unchanged, however, is the regulatory framework for
investigating and ensuring compliance with Title VI.142
The overall success of Lau v. Nichols, as it turns out, hinged on regula-
tory authority and represented a triumph for the bureaucrats who wielded it.
For the National Education Association and school districts to characterize
the OCR guidelines as legal authority almost certainly represented an expan-
sion of existing civil rights and regulatory authority. Typically, policy inno-
vation via regulatory guidance represents elaborations of existing statutory
rights rather than expansions of rights. But here, in the context of language
rights, the statutory text and legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
Green Library, Stanford, Cal., and Moran, supra note 103, at 111). The lawsuit was subse-
quently withdrawn. The Northwest Arctic litigation is described in Moran, supra note 103, at
137-38.
' The 1980 NPRM is described in the OCR's official policy regarding the treatment of
national origin minority students who are limited English proficient. See Memorandum from
William L. Smith, supra note 132.
139 See id.
'" 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).
14 Compare id. at 1010 (looking to whether the school district took "appropriate action"),
with Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 565 (1974) ("[Section 71 of the California Education
Code] also states as 'the policy of the state' to insure 'the mastery of English by all pupils in
the schools.' And bilingual instruction is authorized 'to the extent that it does not interfere
with the systematic, sequential, and regular instruction of all pupils in the English
language."').
142 Skeptics of Title VI's continuing power point to constraints placed on disparate impact
theories of discrimination after Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). See, e.g., infra
note 272. While Sandoval undoubtedly has limited Title VI enforcement, it has mostly done
so by eliminating private enforcement of rights articulated in the statute; regulatory enforce-
ment of these rights remains intact. 532 U.S. at 285.
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include almost no discussion of the definition of national origin. Language
rights became a concrete concept through OCR's statutory interpretation in
the course of implementing regulatory guidance.
D. EEOC's Interpretation of Title VII As Eliminating English-Only
Workplace Policies Founders on Implementation
Developing responses to language barriers in workplaces proved even
more difficult than in schools. The Title VII framework for dismantling and
preventing racial discrimination grew out of court decisions trying to bal-
ance institutional commitments to racial inclusion with the business necessi-
ties of private employers. These efforts gradually expanded from initial
efforts to eradicate discriminatory intent to efforts to eliminate the effects of
this discrimination.143 Despite the initial success of programs to boost repre-
sentation of racial minorities in workforces, it was unclear how the EEOC
could open workplaces to national origin minorities with limited English
abilities. Even among those possessing legal status and basic job qualifica-
tions, employees lacking language abilities would not be competitive in
skills tests or interviews administered in English. Once hired, discrimination
on the job against non-English speaking workers based on their actual or
perceived national origin sealed them off from advancement. Some workers
faced intentional discrimination or harassment from supervisors and cowork-
ers on the basis of their language ability or accent. Others found their job
performance negatively reviewed by employers or customers, even where
language skills were not essential to their job. Some employers formalized
their unspoken expectations for an English-speaking workforce in workplace
policies restricting the use of native languages at work, but others main-
tained de facto language policies.144
143 The expansion of disparate treatment to include disparate impact is examined by Pro-
fessor Olatunde Johnson. See Johnson, supra note 98, at 133-45. The rise of affirmative
action policies is described as part of this trajectory as well. See SKRETfNY, supra note 31, at
89-100; Nicholas Pedriana & Robin Stryker, The Strength of a Weak Agency: Enforcement of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Expansion of State Capacity, 1965-1971, 110
AM. J. Soc. 709, 720-22 (2004).
'" English-only rules in the workplace represent, in many ways, the private sector's rendi-
tion of laws such as the failed proposal by Senator Hayakawa to amend the U.S. Constitution
to declare English as the official language or the successful California proposition to ban
bilingual education. S.J. Res. 72, 97th Cong. (1981) (failed constitutional amendment);
Schools and School Districts - English Language in Public Schools - Initiative Statute,
1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 227 (West) (California proposition banning bilingual education in
most cases). Whereas the official English movement is largely symbolic, however, English-
only workplace rules have very practical implications. Communication skills often go to the
heart of job qualifications that are usually left to the discretion of private employers, and job
qualifications, of course, serve as legally permissible grounds for hiring and firing. The
problems associated with language discrimination in the workplace are compounded by the not
uncommon use of language ability as a proxy for racial minority status, itself a prohibited basis
for discrimination under Title VII.
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In comparison to the OCR's success in the education context, the EEOC
failed to secure similar regulatory rights for non-English speaking workers
in employment discrimination law under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, de-
spite nearly identical statutory language in Titles VI and VII. Title VII was,
in many ways, the centerpiece of the Civil Rights Act. In addition to regu-
lating the hiring, firing, and workplace practices of private employers,145 it
created an independent commission to ensure that those employers did not
run afoul of civil rights laws.146 Congress debated the substance and struc-
ture of the EEOC against a background of social unrest and across changing
presidential administrations. 14 Political compromises made to attain the
bill's passage resulted in murkiness in the Title's provisions concerning the
EEOC's implementation and enforcement powers. For example, Congress
constrained the EEOC's ability to issue substantive rules by giving the
EEOC only procedural rulemaking powers.148 The Commission issued a
slew of regulations in its early days, in an effort to reduce the size of its
backlog and to clarify its expectations of employers. These regulations were
presumably issued as procedural rules. The philosophy behind the strategy
was simple: the clearer the compliance standards, the fewer the violations;
the more violations resolved administratively, the less reliance on slow and
costly litigation. Because of a congressional limitation on the EEOC's abil-
ity to issue substantive analyses of the Civil Rights Act, however, the agency
is constrained to issuing guidances.
By far, the focus of EEOC's early actions was on racial discrimina-
tion. 14 Comparatively little action was taken on national origin, religion, or
gender.5 0 With an ambiguous text and little legislative history to guide its
interpretation, the EEOC entered into its enforcement of national origin dis-
crimination with few dictates."' The congressional record shows little dis-
145 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (2006).
146 The EEOC was an independent, bipartisan five-person commission created for the spe-
cific purpose of consolidating and enforcing civil rights provisions in the workplace that had
previously been dispersed among the Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, and
Federal Contracts. Hugh Davis Graham's magisterial history book, The Civil Rights Era, is
perhaps the most authoritative. See GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 177-204. More recent histo-
ries have been written about various aspects of the EEOC's work. See generally FARHANG,
supra note 34; SKRENTNY, supra note 31; Robert Lieberman, Ideas, Institutions, and Political
Order: Explaining Political Change, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 697 (2002); Pedriana & Stryker,
supra note 143.
147 See GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 97-99.
148 See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-12 (2006); 2 EMPLOYMENT DIscIUMINATION COORDINATOR
§ 71:9 (search "WestlawNext" for "2 Emp. Discrim. Coord. Analysis of Federal Law
§ 71:9"); see also text accompanying note 64.
149 See FARHANG, supra note 34, at 132; RUBY Y. WEINBRECHT ET AL., EEOC, THE EEOC
DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON: NOVEMBER 1963-JANuARY
1969, at 106 (1968).
150 Compare WEINBRECHT ET AL., supra note 149, at 107-72 (describing early compliance
actions based on racial discrimination), with id. at 231-45 (describing early actions related to
sex, religion, and testing).
' Elsewhere, I have found that while "national origin" appeared for the first time in
federal legislation in 1957, it had existed in state level civil rights laws going back to Franklin
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cussion of the national origin provision. Representative Roosevelt attempted
to provide a definition by saying, "May I just make very clear that national
origin means national. It means the country from which you or your fore-
bears came from. You may come from Poland, Czechoslovakia, England,
France, or any other country." 5 2
Courts interpreting the legislative history of the term "national origin"
were likewise inconclusive about Congress's intended meaning. In the only
Supreme Court case to interpret "national origin," Espinoza v. Farah Manu-
facturing,153 the Court constrains itself to a cramped definition of the term
and opines that the record on the meaning of national origin is "quite meager
in this respect." 5 4 The Commission initially took the safe route, navigating
the uncharted waters of national origin discrimination by importing estab-
lished theories of liability from race and sex cases into its national origin
jurisprudence. For example, Title VII generally prohibits discrimination in
hiring, promotion, or firing decisions.' In making those decisions, how-
ever, employers may be permitted to discriminate if they can show that there
was a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for distinguishing on this basis.
For example, an employer could specify a preference on the basis of a pro-
tected category if the preference is considered "a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise."' 6 Courts interpreting the bona fide occupation qual-
ifications statutory language have provided this example in the context of
national origin: a French restaurant might legally favor a French chef on the
basis of her national origin.'"
D. Roosevelt's administration and in immigration law since the 1920s. See generally Ming H.
Chen, Nation of Immigrants or New Civil Rights Movement? (March 2006) (unpublished con-
ference paper) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Initially, the term was likely
directed at Eastern- and Southern-European immigrants. In federal civil rights law, the adop-
tion of "national origin" in the 1957 and 1964 Civil Rights Acts appears to have been part of
civil rights boilerplate language. The influx of new groups and mobilization of identity polit-
ics, however, made the national origin category more salient after 1965. See Stephen M. Cut-
ler, Note, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J.
1164, 1170 n.26 (1985) (claiming that the first federal use of "national origin" is in the 1957
Civil Rights Act language defining the duties of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights).
152 110 CONG. REc. 2549 (1964).
15 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
154 Id. at 88-89. The Court additionally specified that national origin was not equivalent
to citizenship, requiring that prior EEOC guidance that was murky on this point be changed.
Id. at 89. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604
(1987), in contrast, says that the line between ancestry and national origin discrimination "is
not a bright one," but that the two often coincide. Id. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring).
' 5 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); JOEL FRIEDMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 36-44 (8th ed. 2011).
11s 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
'5 E.g., Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 535 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 456 U.S. 273 (1982); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 298 (N.D. Tex.
1981); cf Gupta v. Walt Disney World Co., 256 F. App'x 279, 282 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Disney's
explanation that Gupta was not allowed to work at the Norwegian restaurant because Gupta




The EEOC released its first specific guidance on national origin dis-
crimination in 1970.158 The 1970 EEOC policy guidance defined national
origin discrimination under Title VII to mean the denial of employment due
to "an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an
individual has physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national
origin group." 5 9 There is little documentary evidence about where the
Commission got the idea for interpreting national origin as including linguis-
tic traits. The major civil rights organizations of the time were focused on
racial discrimination in the workplace. The few thinking about national ori-
gin minorities focused on citizenship eligibility requirements and the inclu-
sion of Hispanics in public offices.160 There is also an absence of
documentary evidence about the motivations of the EEOC Commissioners
who sought to advance a theory of language rights for national origin minor-
ities: there were no alarming studies, high-profile incidents, or political pres-
sures from Congress or the White House about language as a component of
national origin discrimination comparable to those in the bilingual education
case study. Very few EEOC charges were taken on the basis of national
origin discrimination in the 1960s and none on the basis of language dis-
crimination.161 The EEOC's official history states that "[flor a variety of
reasons related to the unique historical circumstances of immigrant popula-
tions, there have traditionally been fewer charges filed with the EEOC alleg-
ing national origin discrimination than on other bases."l 62 Paul Burstein, a
sociologist who studies the EEOC, confirms this record; he lists few national
origin charges before the late 1960s.163
Enforcement of language rights for workers gained salience in the late
1970s and 1980s with increased challenges to workplace policies prohibiting
workers from speaking Spanish on the job. '16 In early cases challenging em-
ployers' actions against employees for violating English-only policies, the
employees took the position that English-only policies constituted de facto
"I Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg. 421 (Jan. 13,
1970) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1).
'9 Id. National origin is generally broader than race, as it encompasses discrimination
within a particular race as well as discrimination based on a person's place of birth. Since
Espinoza, however, it does not include discrimination based on citizenship. Espinoza v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973) ("Aliens are protected from illegal discrimination under the
[Civil Rights] Act [of 1964], but nothing in the Act makes it illegal to discriminate on the
basis of citizenship or alienage.").
' See generally RISA GOLUBoFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2010).
161 Cf WEINBRECHT ET AL., supra note 149 (describing history of early EEOC enforce-
ment and making no mention of language discrimination charges).
162 Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of Title VII, EEOC (June 24, 2004), http://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/40th/panel/expanding.htmil, archived at http://perma.cc/93TY-
JRMM. See also Pedriana & Stryker, supra note 143.
163 See Paul Burstein, Legal Mobilization as a Social Movement Tactic: The Struggle for
Equal Employment Opportunity, 96 AM. J. Soc. 1201 (1991).
'" See DEL VALLE, supra note 9, at 118 ("The principal manifestation of the ambivalence
felt toward language-minority workers has been the proliferation of English-only workplace
rules enforced by employers of bilingual employees.").
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discrimination.'65 The EEOC agreed with this interpretation in its 1970s im-
plementation efforts. As noted above, the EEOC had enacted a guidance
extending national origin discrimination to language in 1970. The 1970 gui-
dance, however, was issued several years before the EEOC participated in
the enforcement action that led to the first federal court decision to address
English-only workplace policies - Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service, 66 in
which the EEOC tried to rely on the interpretation laid out in the 1970 gui-
dance.167 In Saucedo, a Texas district court recognized the disparate impact
of such rules on language minorities. The employer, Brothers Well, dis-
missed Saucedo, a bilingual Mexican-American employee, for asking his co-
worker where to place a heavy metal part in Spanish.16 Brothers Well
claimed that the deviation from English jeopardized the safety and teamwork
of its employees.' 69 Although the court did not preclude all English-only
policies, the court agreed with Saucedo that such policies have a potentially
disparate impact on ethnic minorities: "A rule that Spanish cannot be spoken
on the job obviously has a disparate impact upon Mexican-American em-
ployees. Most Anglo-Americans obviously have no desire and no ability to
speak foreign languages on or off the job."7 0 The Court further held that the
employer applied the English-only rule in a discriminatory manner and did
not prove the English-only rule was a business necessity.
In the 1980s, the EEOC's regulatory authority increasingly encroached
on the terrain of private employers and federal courts in the context of chal-
lenges to English-only policies. The issue of authority - who decides and
on what legal basis - stood squarely at the center of Garc(a v. Gloor,7' the
most prominent federal court case to challenge English-only workplace poli-
cies under Title VII from this time period.'72 Gloor involved a lumber yard
that imposed a rule prohibiting employees from speaking Spanish on the job
unless they were communicating with Spanish-speaking customers; the rule
did not apply to communication during breaks.'73 Hector Garcia, a bilingual
employee at the lumber yard, testified that on June 10, 1975, he was asked a
question by another Mexican-American employee about an item requested
by a customer and he responded in Spanish that the article was not availa-
ble. 74 Alton Gloor, an officer and stockholder of Gloor, overheard the con-
versation. "Thereafter Mr. Garcia was discharged.""' Gloor said that
W6 See, e.g., Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
'66Id.
'67 Id. at 923.
168 Id. at 921.
169 d
'
7 0 Id. at 922.
' 618 F. 2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
172 Id. at 268-69 ("No authority cited to us gives a person a right to speak any particular
language while at work.").





Garcia's discharge was for a combination of job-related deficiencies as well
as for violation of the English-only rule.'76 While he said the company's
English-only policy was not strictly enforced, he also claimed that Garcia
had violated it "at every opportunity since the time of his hiring according to
his own testimony." 7 "In addition to offering this evidence to justify firing
Mr. Garcia, Mr. Gloor testified that there were business reasons for the lan-
guage policy.""' Among others, Gloor claimed English-speaking customers
objected to communications between employees that they could not under-
stand.'79 Gloor also claimed the rule would permit supervisors, who did not
speak Spanish, to oversee the work of subordinates better.'8 0 "The district
court found that these were valid business reasons and that they, rather than
discrimination, were the motive for the rule.""' Garcia claimed that, while
he was capable of speaking both English and Spanish, Spanish was his pri-
mary language so that the English-only rule was difficult to follow.182 More-
over, his language was a defining characteristic of his national origin so that
being denied the right to speak in his preferred language qualified as dis-
crimination on the basis of national origin.' In amicus briefs on Garcfa's
behalf, attorneys from the EEOC and the League of United Latin American
Citizens of the United States sought a broad ruling to protect bilingual work-
ers from language discrimination. 1
The Fifth Circuit ruled against Garcia's interpretation of Title VII, say-
ing that the plain language of Title VII did not establish the meaning of
national origin discrimination and that "neither the statute nor common un-
derstanding equates national origin with the language that one chooses to
speak."' 5 While the court recognized that in some circumstances, "lan-
guage may be used as a covert basis for national origin discrimination," it
held that the English-only rule was not applied to Garcia by the Gloor Com-
pany for this purpose.'"' Even if it had been, the court failed to see the harm
in regulating the speech of bilingual employees, as such employees lacked
any substantive privilege to speak their preferred language on the job. The
court said "[Garcia's] argument . . . reduces itself to a contention that the
statute commands employers to permit employees to speak the tongue they
prefer. We do not think the statute permits that interpretation, whether the
176 Id.





182 Id. at 266.
'8 Id. at 268.
'" Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae at 12,
Garcla, 618 F.2d 264 (No. 77-2358); Brief of the League of United Latin American Citizens
of the U.S. Amicus Curiae at 9, Garc(a, 618 F.2d 264 (No. 77-2358).
1'5 Garc(a, 618 F.2d at 268.
186 Id.
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preference be slight or strong or even one closely related to self-identity."'
It bears noting that by claiming that there was no established link between
national origin discrimination and English-only policies, the court was dis-
crediting the EEOC's prior positions on English-only policies as
nonauthoritative.'"8 The court also critiqued the agency's reliance on its
1970 guidance because the guidance did not speak squarely to the issue of
English-only policies; it merely spoke to discrimination based on linguistic
characteristics and left the implications for English-only policies to infer-
ence. Directly attacking the agency's rulemaking authority, in dicta, the
court questioned the EEOC's authority and expertise to elucidate the mean-
ing of national origin discrimination in a manner that went beyond the stat-
ute."' The case turned out to be a loss for Garcfa and perhaps even more so
for the EEOC with respect to regulatory authority.'"
After the litigation subsided, on December 29, 1980, the EEOC re-
sponded to the critique in Gloor by revising its 1970 guidelines to more
explicitly address English-only policies.'9' The 1980 EEOC interpretation
lessens the burden on employees to prove the discriminatory intent of lan-
guage policies.192 Two sections are particularly noteworthy. First, the 1980
interpretation reaffirmed the Commission's 1970 definition of national origin
discrimination as denial of equal employment opportunity because of an in-
dividual's linguistic characteristics. '19 Second, the 1980 interpretation said
that statutory section 1606.7 makes English-only rules prima facie evidence
of discrimination, making it easier for employees to prove that the motiva-
tion for such policies was unlawful discrimination.194
Returning to the notion of administrative law in action from section I.C,
the EEOC had promulgated its 1970 Guidance on National Origin Discrimi-
nation as a set of interpretative rules, which would typically fall into the
APA exception for notice and comment procedures (meaning that such pro-
cedures would not be required). While not required to do so, the EEOC
bolstered its agency procedures when it used the notice and comment pro-
cess to revise its national origin guidance in 1980. The EEOC's voluntary
solicitation of comments generated voluminous public commentary, even
'7 Id. at 271.
18 "While the EEOC has considered in specific instances whether a policy prohibiting the
speaking of Spanish in normal interoffice contacts discriminates on the basis of national origin,
it has adopted neither a regulation stating a standard for testing such language rules nor any
general policy, presumed to be derived from the statute, prohibiting them." Id. at 268 n.1
(citation omitted).
'
8 9 Id. at 271.
'9 To clarify, as a result of losing, the EEOC was unable to use English-only policies as
prima facie evidence of national origin discrimination in that case.
'9' Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,635 (Dec.
29, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1606).





though the EEOC did not claim to be enacting binding regulations.' Also,
the agency's position in 1980 was consistent with its earlier interpretation in
1970.196 While not decisive, consistency and the extent of deliberative pro-
cess were factors courts used at the time to determine the persuasiveness of
agency guidance. Congress's implicit consent to subsequent interpretations
would also have been persuasive to courts. When Congress later amended
Title VII to clarify the standards for proving disparate impact discrimination
after Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,197 the Senate discussed the national
origin guidelines and decided not to alter them. Senator Dennis DeConcini,
in response to his Arizonan constituents' concerns about English-only poli-
cies, asked Senator Edward Kennedy whether the national origin guidelines
would remain in effect during Senate floor debate. Kennedy replied affirma-
tively that the guidelines had been effective and so the 1991 amendments
would not affect their validity.'19
Public comments on the 1980 guidelines, voluntarily solicited rather
than required by the APA, indicated that many private individuals opposed
the proposed guidelines.'" In particular, some worried that the policy would
stoke an anti-immigrant backlash.21 00 The staff of Regulation magazine wrote
to criticize the EEOC's "questionable administrative interpretation(s)" of Ti-
tle VII as encompassing affirmative action and prohibiting English-only
workplace policies.201 It rejected the gradual and "elusive" process of ex-
195 EEOC, GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF NATIONAL ORIGIN; PROPOSED
GUIDELINES: COMMENTS (EEOC Library Archives Collection, 1980).
'" Cf Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973) (declining to defer to EEOC
guidelines because EEOC flip-flopped on the definition of national origin); Pub. Emps. Ret.
Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989) (noting agency's interpretation may be entitled to
special deference if its interpretation is consistent).
' 400 U.S. 642 (1989).
' 137 CONG. REC. S15, 489 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
'"9 E.g., Letter from Peggy K. Kramer to Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chairperson, EEOC
(Sept. 19, 1980), in GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF NATIONAL ORIGIN, supra
note 195 (private citizen opposed to Guidelines). Bound volumes are contained in the EEOC
library and also held at NARA H. See also Michael Patterson, Garcia v. Spun Steak Com-
pany: English-Only Rules in the Workplace, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 227, 287 (1995) ("The Commis-
sion carefully solicited comments from federal entities and the public at large to assure that the
process included 'interested persons' in 'all stages of [the] rulemaking process."' (citation
omitted)). Minutes of the 1980 EEOC Commissioner meetings characterize the revision of the
1970s guidelines as "minor." Consequently, the proposed guidelines were approved swiftly
and unanimously (5-0), with a concerted effort to make them available for public comment
during the week of September 16, 1980 (Hispanic Heritage Week). The hearings generated a
large number of public comments from businesses, public interest groups, and individual citi-
zens. For further inquiry, original documents were obtained from the EEOC Headquarters
Library in Washington, D.C. and are on file with the author.
200 E.g., Letter from Peggy K. Kramer to Eleanor Holmes Norton, supra note 199 ("Why
promote HATE from the majority (English speaking people) against these people by proposing
such an unnecessary guideline?"); Letter from Vincent A. Borlaug to EEOC Executive Secre-
tariat, in GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF NATIONAL ORIGIN, supra note 195
("this regulation, if enforced, will stir up wide-spread ill will and unrest").
201 In the same Winter 1980 issue of Regulation magazine that criticized the OCR, the
staff criticized the EEOC for both its affirmative action and language rights policies. Compar-
ing the OCR regulations supplying an affirmative duty to accommodate language minorities to
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tending national origin protection to language problems. "Yesterday's tenta-
tive suggestions become today's hardened dogmas, the shift in emphasis
never being squarely presented for public debate and no one at a high level
of political accountability ever taking clear responsibility for the new ap-
proach,"2 02 the magazine complained. Staff within the EEOC continued to
debate their stance on Gloor in updating their compliance manual, which
included as an example of national discrimination a fact pattern counter to
the Fifth Circuit's holding. 203
During subsequent enforcement efforts that relied on the 1980 gui-
dance, circuit courts wavered in their reception to the EEOC's interpretation.
The Ninth Circuit, a jurisdiction hearing many language cases, vacillated in
its support. In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.,204 for example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found no evidence of discriminatory treatment when a Spanish-speaking
radio disk jockey was fired after unsuccessfully using Spanish on air as part
of an effort to boost the number of Hispanic listeners.205 It substantially
based its opinion on the Fifth Circuit's interpretation in Gloor and inciden-
tally disregarded the EEOC guidelines insofar as the court held that Jurado
failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination.206 One year later, how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit did follow the EEOC guidance in Gutierrez v. Munic-
ipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District.207 In Gutierrez, the Ninth
Circuit expressly adopted the EEOC guidelines' conclusion that English-only
rules are inherently discriminatory and thus constitute prima facie evidence
of discrimination.2 08 The Gutierrez decision supporting the EEOC guide-
lines was vacated209 prior to Supreme Court review and, in any case, was
overturned in Garcia v. Spun Steak 210 Spun Steak explicitly rejected the
EEOC guidelines on the grounds that they contravened congressional intent
with regard to the definition of national origin:
In holding that the enactment of an English-only while working
policy does not inexorably lead to an abusive environment for
hiring quotas, it took offense at what it perceived as "a questionable administrative interpreta-
tion." Editorial, Bilingual Education: The New Accent in Civil Rights Regulation, 4 REG. 5,
5-8 (1980).
202 Id.
203 Interview with Ernie Heffner, EEOC Office of Legal Counsel Staff Att'y, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Sept. 16, 2009) (Heffner served as primary author for the compliance manual for
national origin discrimination). As of November 2013, the EEOC was holding public hearings
on its national origin documents and soliciting public input. See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC
Meeting Highlights Challenges to Title VII National Origin Enforcement (Nov. 13, 2013),
available at http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/ 1-13-13.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/
J78F-D9ZS.
204 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
205 Id. at 1410 ("We find insufficient evidence that the English-only order was racially
motivated.").
206 Id. at 1409, 1411.
207 See 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).
0 Id. at 1040.
209 Mun. Court of the S.E. Judicial Dist. v. Gutierrez, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
210 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
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those whose primary language is not English, we reach a conclu-
sion opposite to the EEOC's longstanding position . . . . [W]e are
not bound by the Guidelines .... We will not defer to an adminis-
trative construction of a statute where there are compelling indica-
tions that it is wrong.2 1'
Spun Steak created division within the Ninth Circuit and a split with the
Tenth Circuit,2 12 among other courts.213 The confused state of the law contin-
ues to this day, with no signs that the Supreme Court intends to step in to
resolve the splintered interpretations.
The legacy of the EEOC implementation of its policy guidance is one
of limited legal effect evidenced by the inability of the EEOC to garner
unified or stable support from courts and to sustain enforcement actions on
its own. The practical effect of EEOC guidance, however, is stronger than
its tepid legal effect. The EEOC continued to press its guidance in adminis-
trative challenges to English-only policies, with some leading to favorable
settlement outcomes for non-English speaking workers despite the non-
precedential nature of the underlying guidance. For example, the EEOC's
enforcement actions have resulted in damages for non-native English speak-
ing workers ranging from $133,000 to $2.44 million, as well as injunctive
relief in some cases. The actions have shaped the policies and practices of a
variety of employers, such as long-distance telecommunications carriers, 214
medical service providers,215 manufacturing companies,2 16 hair salons,217 and
211 Id. at 1489. The dissenting opinion agreed with the majority along these lines: "EEOC
regulations are entitled to somewhat less weight than those promulgated by an agency with
Congressionally delegated rulemaking authority." Id. at 1490 (Boochever, J., dissenting).
212 See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006). While Maldonado
recognized that English-only rules could be construed as inherently discriminatory, the court
expressly stated that it was not adopting the EEOC guidelines. Id. at 1305.
213 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, No. 89-1679-CIV-T-17, 1991 WL 11009376
(M.D. Fla. June 3, 1991), affd without opinion, 985 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1993) (unpublished
table decision) (district court opinion glosses over EEOC guidelines and burden shifting analy-
sis in reaching its decision that English-only rules are not discriminatory where the employee
has some ability to speak English); Long v. First Union Corp., 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision). For a discussion of more court decisions on English-only work-
place rules after Maldonado, see Andrew Robinson, Language, National Origin, and Employ-
ment Discrimination: The Importance of the EEOC Guidelines, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1514, 1522
(2009); and Robyn Stoter, Discrimination & Deference: Making a Case for the EEOC's Exper-
tise with English Only Rules, 53 VILL. L. REv. 595 (2008).
234 EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1077-78 (N.D. Tex.
2000) (granting a $700,000 award in damages on behalf of thirteen Latino employees); see
also Press Release, EEOC, Court Speaks: English Only Rule Unlawful; Awards EEOC
$700,000 for Hispanic Workers (Sept. 19, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/news-
room/release/9-19-00.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/82LN-NQJ8.
215 Settlement Resolves Sexual Harassment, Retaliation, 'English-Only' Policy Com-
plaints, DAILY LABOR, Nov. 20, 1998, at A-7; see also Press Release, EEOC, Delano Regional
Medical Center to Pay Nearly $1 Million in EEOC National Origin Discrimination Suit (Sept.
17, 2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroomi/release/9-17-12a.cfm, archived at
http://perma.cc/E7AR-DZQB (reporting a $975,000 settlement on behalf of Filipino-American
hospital workers against Delano Regional Medical Center).
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others.218 Some commentators believe that the EEOC's continued enforce-
ment of its national origin guidance, as well as the robust settlements it has
procured, has strengthened protections for language minorities in the
workforce,2 19 and the EEOC has continued to reinforce its commitment to
216 Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Reaches Landmark 'English-Only' Settlement; Chicago
Manufacturer to Pay Over $190,000 to Hispanic Workers (Sept. 1, 2000), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-1-00.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/GPB8-NTCW
(reporting a recent settlement against Watlow Batavia, Inc., where defendant had to pay
$192,500 to eight Hispanic former employees).
237 T. Shawn Taylor, English-Only Dispute Ends in Settlement, CHI. TRIB. (July 31, 2002),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-07-31/business/0207310129_1_english-only-regis-
corp-hair-salons, archived at http://perma.cc/6AWV-BH5C (reporting a $240,000 settlement
against a chain of hair salons in Chicago on behalf of six former Hispanic employees).
218 See, e.g., EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 914-15 (N.D. Ill.
1999) (rejecting a motion to dismiss a claim of national origin discrimination against the de-
fendant company on account of its English-only policy, finding that the EEOC's guidelines,
which state that the presence of an English-only policy creates the inference of national origin
discrimination, validly interpreted Title VII, and distinguishing the case from Spun Steak,
which was not binding on the court); Complaint, EEOC v. Sephora USA, No. 03 CV 8821
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2003) (challenging the enforcement of an English-only policy in a class
action suit against Sephora Cosmetics); Allen Smith, EEOC Settlement Reflects Rise in Chal-
lenges of English-Only Policies, 54 HR MAG. 26 (Apr. 21, 2009) (discussing the EEOC's
settlement of EEOC v. Royalwood Care Center LLC, CA No. CV 05-6895 ABC (PLAx) (C.D.
Cal.), in which Royalwood Care Center had to pay its Hispanic employees up to $450,000, as
well as provide various training programs); Cindy Waxer, English-Only Policies Can Translate
into Problems for Employers, WORKFORCE (Jan. 5, 2004), http://www.workforce.com/articles/
english-only-policies-can-translate-into-problems-for-employers, archived at http://perma.cc/
3FJZ-PAM8 (reporting a $1.5 million settlement against Colorado Central Station Casino, and
noting that "hefty settlements might slow the spread of English-only policies"); Press Release,
EEOC, EEOC Settles English-Only Suit for $2.44 Million Against University of Incarnate
Word (Apr. 20, 2001), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-20-01.cfm, archived at
http://perma.cc/5D2F-6G4T; Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Sues Arizona Diner for National
Origin Bias Against Navajos and Other Native Americans (Sept. 30, 2002), http://
wwwl.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/9-30-02-c.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/R8FZ-
GF9A (discussing the EEOC's still ongoing first ever English-only lawsuit brought by the
Commission on behalf of Native Americans); Press Release, EEOC, Melrose Hotel, Berwind
Property Group, to Pay $800,000 to Settle National Origin Bias Suit by EEOC (Mar. 16,
2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/press/3-16-06a.html, archived at http://perma.cc/T6V2-LER8;
Press Release, EEOC, Mesa Systems to Pay $450,000 to Settle EEOC National Origin Dis-
crimination Lawsuit (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-30-
13a.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/M5TJ-8CC6 (discussing the EEOC's settlement with
Mesa Systems, Inc., a moving and storage company, on behalf of Hispanic workers who were
subject to verbal abuse and a restrictive language policy).
219 See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1689, 1736 (2006) (reviewing recent cases and settlements regarding English-only poli-
cies, and stating, "Recent court victories may also explain the willingness of some employers
to settle, despite the paucity of court victories for plaintiffs."); Press Release, EEOC Settles
English-Only Suit for $2.44 Million Against University of Incarnate Word, supra note 218
(reporting that the number of discrimination charges about English-only policies filed with the
EEOC and local Fair Employment Practices Agencies has been increasing, with a nearly 500%
increase between Fiscal Year 1996 and Fiscal Year 2000); cf LAWYERS ALLIANCE FOR N.Y.,
"SPEAK ENGLISH ONLY" WORKPLACE RULES: PROCEED WrrH CAUTION (2007), available at
http://www.lawyersalliance.org/pdfs/newslegal/July_07_English-onlyRules_FINAL.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/KM2M-YCWT (advising employers to be cautious of implement-
ing English-only policies, discussing the EEOC's guidance about English-only policies, and




this end.2 20 These settlements illustrate the value of guidances and the ability
of agencies wielding guidances to advance civil rights.
IV. GOVERNING By GUIDANCE
Abstracting key elements of the language rights case studies, this Arti-
cle demonstrates that civil rights agencies were the engine of civil rights
expansions on behalf of language minorities. More specifically, these insti-
tutional actors used guidances to innovate on existing civil rights protec-
tions. Their interpretations of broadly-worded civil rights statutes enabled
them to articulate language rights where the statutory text did not clearly
provide for them. This account of the development of language rights draws
attention to the phenomenon of governing by guidance, a heretofore ne-
glected subject in the historiography of the Civil Rights Act. The case stud-
ies illuminate the time period following the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act as a moment when the practice of governing by guidance was used to
great effect.221
This Article also offers a nuanced explanation for differences in the
ability of the OCR and the EEOC to govern through guidance. Comparing
the case studies, the Article finds that agencies relied on courts to instantiate
the legal effect of their guidances, even if the framework for judicial review
was not yet well settled. Courts functioned either to sustain agency guid-
ances (in schools) or to stall them (in workplaces) during enforcement ac-
tions. In keeping with the assumptions of modem administrative law, the
interaction between courts and agencies mattered critically to whether lan-
guage rights articulated in guidances could survive, and accounts for some
of the divergence between the two case studies. The reason for differences
does not end there, however. The Article additionally finds that agencies
forged meaningful civil rights protections independent of the judiciary. In
the absence of a clear doctrinal test to distinguish binding agency rules from
nonbinding agency guidances, agency guidances gained traction through
their practical effects even more than by asserting legal control over the
administration of language rights in schools and workplaces. 222
A. Agency Guidance Instrumental in Civil Rights Protection
This section extracts from the case studies the elements of governing by
guidance. First, agencies took the lead in statutory interpretation to extend
220 Press Release, EEOC, Mesa Systems to Pay $450,000 to Settle EEOC National Origin
Discrimination Lawsuit, supra note 219 (reporting EEOC Chair Jacqueline Berrien's statement,
"In its Strategic Enforcement Plan, the EEOC made it a priority to protect workers who are the
most vulnerable . . . . This settlement is an important demonstration of this renewed
commitment.").
221 See supra sections HlI.C-D.
222 Id.
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the promises of the Civil Rights Act to language minorities. Created by Title
VI for the purpose of ensuring equal educational opportunity, the OCR exer-
cised its expert judgment on the statutory meaning of the statute's national
origin discrimination prohibition and its relevance to the needs of non-En-
glish speaking schoolchildren. 223 The OCR had conducted extensive review
of the conditions in the schools in question, consulted with experts on educa-
tion of LEP students, and collaborated with parents of LEP schoolchildren
about their goals for their children before enacting guidance pursuant to sec-
tion 601.224 The OCR enacted guidance on the basis of these investigations
outside the notice and comment procedures. Like the OCR, the EEOC used
guidance to elaborate on Title VII's national origin discrimination provi-
sion. 25 Although it was not required to undertake notice and comment pro-
cedures in enacting interpretive guidance, the EEOC held public hearings
and published its guidance in the Federal Register.
The interpretive exercise in which agencies engage is necessarily a cre-
ative process that gives rise to meaningful legal protections.226 In agencies,
the use of policy documents to interpret the meanings of vague statutory
terms is a core function, whether the interpretation takes the form of notice
and comment rules or interpretive rules exempt from APA requirements.
Most scholars, ranging from those with great tolerance for administrative
policy entrepreneurship227 to those who are generally conservative about
agency power,228 accept this interpretive function of agencies as necessary
and justified. These scholars recognize that Congress is often unable to
write statutes with sufficient specificity for the underlying policies to be im-
plemented. The reasons are many. Congress may not have contemplated a
specific issue. The legislative process may have led to rushing, compromise,
and either deliberate or implicit delegation of details to agencies.22 9 Lan-
" See supra section HI.C.
224 Interview with Paul Grossman, Chief Civil Rights Att'y, Office for Civil Rights, Dep't
of Health, Educ. & Welfare, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 5, 2008).
225 See supra section III.D.
226 See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
"I William N. Eskridge & Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency Norm-Entrepreneur-
ship, 115 YALE L.J. 2623, 2623-24 (2006) (arguing that Chevron requires judges to defer to
virtually all agency interpretations if not inconsistent with statutory plain meaning). This inter-
pretation is grounded in the executive branch's own lawmaking authority and also draws upon
the authors' notion that agencies are especially empowered to apply fundamental norms con-
tained in super-statutes that encapsulate fundamental rights such as civil rights.
228 Professor Robert Anthony refers to interpretive rules as the one exception to the gen-
eral proposition that nonlegislative rules should not be used to bind the public. See Anthony,
supra note 50, at 1313. Other scholars adopting similar views presume that agency interpreta-
tion is circumscribed by congressional intent because Congress must have delegated lawmak-
ing authority to an agency for agencies to legitimately exercise power.
229 See generally Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Draft-
ing: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 594 (2002) (describing political
realities of the drafting process and specifically citing interviews with legislative staffers who
agree that language should be "as clear as it can be" and yet see deliberate ambiguity as an
equally powerful force working against clarity due to an absence of consensus on a particular
point in a bill).
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guage can simply be indeterminate. Also, in the face of complex or un-
resolved policy judgments, Congress may prefer to delegate rulemaking
authority to agencies. The House and Senate Committee Reports on the
Civil Rights Act indicate that Congress viewed discrimination as such a
topic:
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex
and pervasive phenomenon . . . . In short, the problem is one
whose resolution in many instances requires not only expert assis-
tance, but also the technical perception that the problem exists in
the first instance, and that the system complained of is unlawful. 23 0
Notwithstanding the vital role of agencies, the case comparison sug-
gests that agency expertise and deliberative process in the promulgation of
guidance was necessary, but not sufficient for judicial acceptance. The justi-
fications offered by courts for the divergent treatment of OCR guidance and
EEOC guidance during this time period do not extensively reference the
process used by agencies enacting guidance or Congress's intent to delegate
rulemaking authority to the agencies."' The expertise rationale, however,
predates these case studies and survives beyond it. Professor Ronald
Krotoszynski has pointed out that, for decades, the U.S. Supreme Court di-
rected lower courts to review agency work product with some measure of
deference on the theory that agencies possess superior expertise over the
matters within their jurisdiction, so long as the particular agency work prod-
uct reflects this specialized expertise.232 The question is usually what level
of deference courts should apply. 233 For example, the Supreme Court held to
the expertise rationale in another EEOC case, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson,234 stating that "Guidelines . . . 'constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for gui-
dance."' 235 Even in Spun Steak, the Ninth Circuit explained that it did not
lightly reject EEOC guidelines because guidelines constitute a body of expe-
rience.236 Precepts of judicial review laid out in the APA also accord with
the historical practice of respecting agency expertise. In the Chevron case
and its progeny, the Supreme Court presumes that Congress intends to dele-
gate interpretive authority in the face of statutory ambiguity: "Deference ...
is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit
230 S. Rep. No. 92-415, at 5 (1971); see also H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, at 8 (1972) (cited in
Hart, supra note 65, at 1952).
231 See supra notes 15 and 52.
232 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference? Implied Delegations, Agency Exper-
tise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 736, 739 (2002) ("When
an agency decision appears to be the product of this specialized expertise, reviewing courts
must afford some measure of deference to the agency's decision.").
233 See id. at 736.
234 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
235 Id. at 65 (citation omitted).
236 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993).
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delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps." 2 37
Thus, Congress invites agencies to help clarify "interstitial . . . legal ques-
tion[s]."238 In addition, where Congress has not definitely resolved an im-
portant policy issue, modem courts properly defer to agencies.239 The
rationales crystallized in modem administrative law support the agency prac-
tices that fostered the development of language rights, even if the cases
themselves were not relied upon at the time. The next section elaborates on
the relationship between courts and agencies in governing by guidance.
B. Guidance's Legal Effect Interdependent with Courts
As explained in section IV.A, this Article has focused on a time period
when doctrines of deference figured less prominently in the acceptance of
agency guidance than they do now. Still, the case studies show that courts
functioned either to sustain agency issuances (in bilingual education) or to
stall them (in workplace language policies) during enforcement actions.
Thus, courts mattered to the agencies' effectiveness, even if the framework
for judicial review of agency interpretations was not well developed. Two
competing philosophies about the relationship between courts and agencies
are apparent in the case studies that illustrate divergent pathways of gov-
eming by guidance.
1. Schools: Integrated Remedial Model.
In schools, courts and agencies became interdependent in the imple-
mentation of agency guidance. In his dissent in the seminal case Alexander
v. Sandoval,240 Justice Stevens described the interdependent relationship be-
tween courts and agencies in the Title VI context as an "integrated remedial
scheme," 241 where courts defer to and enforce agencies' promulgated guid-
ances and provide agencies' requested remedies. The Supreme Court in Lau
v. Nichols satisfied itself that the statutory grounds for protecting language
minorities existed within Title V124 2 such that the articulation of language
rights constituted the details of policy implementation - matters within the
237 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
238 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); see also supra note 222.
239 See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMiN. L.
REv. 363, 370 (1986) ("A court may also ask whether the legal question is an important one.
Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving
interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute's daily administration.");
Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron - The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
821, 822 (1990) ("Chevron's rule - that the federal judiciary must defer to an agency's rea-
sonable construction of a statute . . . is simply a sound recognition that a political branch, the
executive, has a greater claim to make policy choices than the judiciary.").
24 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
241 Id. at 304, 310 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) ("We do not reach the Equal Protection Clause argument
which has been advanced but rely solely on § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
334
Governing by Guidance
agency's discretion. Without classifying the OCR memo as binding or non-
binding and without citing a specific standard of review, the majority
respected the agency's decision to require schools to bridge language gaps.
The majority acknowledged the rulemaking authority of the OCR under sec-
tion 602 of the Civil Rights Act,2 43 although it was not entirely clear whether
it relied upon it. The majority referenced the OCR guidelines on national
origin that require school districts receiving federal funds to "'rectify the
language deficiency in order to open' the instruction to students who had
'linguistic deficiencies"' within its section 601 discussion, suggesting reli-
ance on the underlying statute. 244 The section 602 rulemaking discussion
included the Court's conclusion that "it seems obvious that the Chinese-
speaking minority receive fewer benefits than the English-speaking majority
... which denies them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educa-
tional program - all earmarks of the discrimination banned by the regula-
tions." 245 Whether the Court relied on statutory authority or regulatory
authority, strictly speaking, it carved out a sphere for agency influence
through the use of guidelines.
The concurring opinion by Justice Stewart more squarely addressed the
issue of legal authority behind the OCR guidance. It rested language rights
on regulatory grounds, positing as "the critical question" whether the regu-
latory guidelines promulgated by the OCR went beyond the authority of sec-
tion 601.246 As its test, the Court upheld the validity of a regulation
promulgated under a general authorization provision such as section 602
"'so long as it is reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legisla-
tion."' 247 Justice Stewart then credited the OCR memorandum as a "'consis-
tent administrative construction"' of remedial legislation and claimed that
such guidance is "'entitled to great weight."' 2 48
After Lau, Title VI transformed from an administrative enforcement
mechanism for protecting constitutional rights into a judicial mechanism for
enforcing administrative rules defining a wide variety of forms of discrimi-
2 Id. at 567 ("By § 602 of the [Civil Rights] Act, HEW is authorized to issue rules,
regulations, and orders to make sure that recipients of federal aid . . . conduct any federally
financed projects consistently with § 601.").
244 Id. (citation omitted).
245 Id. at 568. The Court's reference to "regulations" apparently refers to the OCR gui-
dance. The majority opinion follows up this analysis with an analogy to contract law, rather
than a discussion of regulatory authority that might take place today under Mead or other
Chevron Step Zero decisions. It states that the school district "contractually agreed to 'comply
with Title VI . .. and all requirements imposed by or pursuant to the Regulation' of HEW . . .
which are 'issued pursuant to that title"' and concludes that "'simple justice requires that
public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination.'" Id. at 568-69 (citation
omitted).
246 Id. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring).
7 Id. (citation omitted).
248 Id. (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)).
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nation.2 49 Under the latter model, courts deciding Title VI civil rights com-
plaints have shifted from reviewing an agency's interpretation of the
underlying statute to reviewing an organization's fidelity to the regulation
itself 2 0 Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Sandoval reviewing Title VI thirty
years later, characterized the interdependence of agency rulemaking and ju-
dicial enforcement after Lau as an integrated remedial model on the basis of
the text and structure of Title VI:
Section 601 does not stand in isolation, but rather as part of an
integrated remedial scheme. Section 602 exists for the sole pur-
pose of forwarding the antidiscrimination ideals laid out in § 601.
The majority's persistent belief that the two sections somehow for-
ward different agendas finds no support in the statute. Nor does
Title VI anywhere suggest, let alone state, that for the purpose of
determining their legal effect, the "rules, regulations, [and] orders
of general applicability" adopted by the agencies are to be bifur-
cated by the Judiciary into two categories based on how closely
the courts believe the regulations track the text of § 601 .251
With the clarity of hindsight, Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion recognizes
federal agencies' broad powers to issue "prophylactic rules" for the purpose
of realizing the vision of Title VI. 252 Whereas section 601 deals with explicit
and unambiguous discrimination using a static approach toward enforce-
ment, section 602 addresses subtle forms of discrimination through a dy-
namic approach. Section 602 delegates to agencies the "'complex
determination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities constituted
sufficiently significant social problems"' to warrant federal intervention.253
This approach builds into the law flexibility and the capacity for nuanced
assessments about complex problems. The integration of court enforcement
and agency rulemaking, in Justice Stevens's view, "reflects a reasonable -
indeed inspired - model for attacking the often-intractable problem of ra-
cial and ethnic discrimination."2- Using the integrated remedial model, ad-
" See Melnick, supra note 6, at 33.
250 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 305-07 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 304.
252 Id. at 305.
253 Id. (citation omitted).
2I Id. at 306. In contrast, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Sandoval, criticized
this gradual creation of implied rights of action. Id. at 291 (majority opinion). Scalia claimed
that the Court had never explicitly recognized a private right of action to enforce agency rules
that sweep more broadly than the text of Title VI unless Congress had independently author-
ized them. Id. Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F. 2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980),
Scalia did not find the agency's substantive interpretations invalid; he just did not find regula-
tory requirements enforceable in court. "Agencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not
the sorcerer himself," he concluded. 532 U.S. at 291. An agency's quest to fulfill the goals of
Title VI rested on the legislature's purpose, not on the regulatory purpose of informal require-
ments. Scalia thus removed from the equation any discussion of the broader enterprise in
which regulatory agencies engage, not to mention the context-specific difficulties of regulating
a problem as intractable as discrimination or as consequential as rights.
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ministrative agencies today define and gather evidence about
"discrimination" in a variety of contexts. They monitor the compliance of
thousands of public and private organizations and redress noncompliance,
costing millions of dollars. The scope of the regulatory enterprise makes
federal courts highly dependent on administrative agencies.
2. Workplace: Court Constraints.
In contrast to the integrated remedial model advanced in schools, courts
constrained the role of guidance in the workplace. In the multiple instances
in which courts addressed EEOC statutory interpretations on national origin
discrimination, their rationale centered on the agency's limited rulemaking
and enforcement powers.255 As explained previously, in the critical deci-
sions referencing the EEOC's English-only guidelines, the circuit courts
questioned the EEOC's ability to engage in substantive rulemaking under
Title VII.256 While some discussion of EEOC's lack of substantive rulemak-
ing powers is to be expected, given the legislative history of the EEOC,
certain exercises of interpretive and procedural rulemaking by the EEOC are
entitled to deference.2 1 As Professor Melissa Hart explained in an article
discussing deference to the EEOC generally,
[T]he Court's lack of deference to the EEOC is part of a broader
picture: The Court has established a bifurcated structure of admin-
istrative deference that leaves much of the kind of interpretation
that the EEOC most often engages in with the "power to per-
suade" but not the "power to control."258
Professor Hart concludes that "even within this framework the EEOC re-
ceives remarkably little respect from the Court." 259 While Professor Hart is
not specifically discussing the Title VII national origin guidelines, her analy-
sis of judicial deference to the EEOC seems applicable to the English-only
opinions.
In addition to limiting rulemaking authority, the EEOC's hybrid en-
forcement scheme limits the agency's enforcement authority. Rather than
relying exclusively on agency enforcement, Title VII enables private liti-
gants to obtain a right-to-sue letter that funnels compliance into the federal
255 Melissa Hart describes the inconsistent standards of deference afforded by the Supreme
Court to the EEOC. She theorizes that the Court adopts idiosyncratic and results-driven levels
of deference for EEOC rulings because it substitutes its own expertise in discrimination for the
EEOC's. Hart, supra note 65, at 1938; see also John S. Moot, Analysis of Judicial Deference
to EEOC Interpretative Guidelines, I ADMIN. L.J. 213 (1987).
256 See supra notes 192-220 and accompanying text.
257 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2006) (granting EEOC "authority from time to time to
issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this
subchapter"); supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
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courts.260 The transfer of enforcement authority from agencies to courts dif-
fers from the Title VI approach that pairs bureaucratized decisionmaking and
judicial review. The EEOC's reliance on private litigation as an enforcement
strategy is vulnerable to the same dysfunctions as courts generally have in an
adversarial legal system: fragmentation, unpredictability, incrementalism,
and expense.2 61 In the end, the legacy of the EEOC's effort to govern by
guidance is mixed. The EEOC tried to advance language rights on behalf of
language minorities against significant odds, and it succeeded for a while via
the 1970 guidance. Yet for a variety of reasons, those initial efforts to gov-
ern through guidance were not enough to endure subsequent litigation chal-
lenges and changed political conditions.2 62
C. Guidance's Practical Effect Independent of Courts
While the case study comparison illuminates the relationship of courts
and agencies as a distinguishing feature of the EEOC's and OCR's attempts
to govern through guidance, judicial acceptance does not fully capture the
distinction. As described in section IV.B, courts did not clearly discuss the
standard of review in the critical language rights cases, let alone cite to Skid-
more or other doctrines of deference stressed in modern administrative
law.2 63 Also, the policies and procedures underlying such discussions argua-
bly disfavor the level of deference afforded by courts given that the EEOC
more closely followed notice and comment procedures than the OCR and yet
received less persuasive weight. This section claims that the practical ef-
260 Sean Farhang provides a thorough discussion of the development of the private litiga-
tion model of enforcement under Title VII. Farhang highlights the political compromises that
led to a hybrid model with shifting emphasis on public and private enforcement from its enact-
ment in 1964 to its revisions in 1972 and 1991. In particular, he notes the irony of civil rights
advocates' and Republican legislators' changing attitudes toward private enforcement over the
years, with civil rights advocates becoming more protective of the private enforcement model
following the unexpected success of a growing civil rights bar and a rightward shift in the
executive branch when Nixon took office. FARHANG, supra note 34, at 228-31. As it turned
out, and against expectation, the private litigation model generally led to vigorous enforcement
and resounding successes in courts from 1965 to 1976. Private enforcement of Title VI dispa-
rate impact theories, upon which language rights partly rely, became available during this time
period. It remains available for disparate treatment cases, but has not been available for dispa-
rate impact cases since 2001. See supra text accompanying notes 252-254; Rose Cuisor Vil-
lazor, Language Rights and Loss of Judicial Remedy: The Impact of Alexander v. Sandoval on
Language Minorities, in AWAKENING FROM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND THE
NEW STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 135 (Denice C. Morgan et al. eds., 2005).
261 Professor Bob Kagan enumerates several pathologies of litigation. These tendencies
were the very reason that the Civil Rights Act aimed to move litigation into administrative
processes. ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 29-31
(2003) ("[The mechanisms of American adversarial legalism - the very kinds of mecha-
nisms that yielded Brown v. Board of Education and the prison reform decisions, and that
sometimes free the unjustly accused - produce irrational, unjust, and inefficient outcomes as
well.").
262 Some reasons could be the changed political conditions by the 1980s, the EEOC's
reputation as a weak agency, or the EEOC's institutional design. See supra section III.D.
263 See supra note 15 and text accompanying note 52.
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fects of agency guidance serve as an important insight into understanding the
significance of agency guidance.
The underlying assumption in this section is that agencies' assertions of
the existence of language rights under the Civil Rights Act were meaningful
even without having clear legal effect - at least at the time they were ac-
cepted and in the absence of contrary legal precedent. As a matter of admin-
istrative law, the substantial impact test was used for many years preceding
the now dominant legal effects test.26 The substantial impact test "entailed
invalidating rules that, despite satisfaction of the legal effects test, had a
substantial impact on regulated parties."2 65 Courts required that agencies is-
suing rules that had a substantial impact undergo notice and comment proce-
dures. Once again, the critical language rights decisions do not clearly
distinguish the OCR and EEOC issuances from regulations, let alone specify
the proper test to do so. Still, the logic of substantial impact might help to
explain greater resistance to the EEOC English-only rules than to the OCR
guidelines. Businesses invoked the affirmative defense of business necessity
when confronted with EEOC guidance,26 6 while schools generally conceded
the need for language accommodation, despite disagreement about the
proper remedies.2 67
Another dimension of understanding governing by guidance is grasping
the practical effect of a guidance on the agency itself.2 68 Setting aside for the
moment the agency's intention to bind regulated entities with their guid-
ances, agencies may use guidances to articulate the agency's interpretations
of what is statutorily required during prospective enforcement actions.
These legal positions may not have independent legal effect, but they may
nonetheless take on legal characteristics insofar as they are the agency's in-
terpretations of what the statute requires when the agency engages in en-
forcement actions. While agencies can change their legal stances relatively
easily - indeed that is one reason they use guidance in lieu of more formal-
ized rulemaking - they often prefer to maintain a consistent legal stance in
their guidances in order to improve their credibility with courts. In this way,
264 The legal effects test was established in PG&E v. Federal Power Commission, 506
F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
265 Thomas Fraser, Interpretive Rules: Can the Amount of Deference Accorded Them Offer
Insight into the Procedural Inquiry?, 90 B.U. L. REv. 1303, 1312 (2010). Fraser explains that
the substantial impact test was established in Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234 (1982). The D.C.
Circuit subsequently disavowed Cabais after Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), because "it engrafted additional proce-
dures on agency action beyond those contemplated by the APA." Id. at 558.
266 See supra notes 165-193 (EEOC discussion).
267 The original OCR memo laying out language rights as part of national origin discrimi-
nation is still in place and continues to shape the regulatory framework of Title VI compliance.
More recently, the impact of the Lau remedies memo on schools has been diluted by Cas-
taneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cit. 1981), which permits schools to choose the curricu-
lar means of satisfying the OCR guidance - thereby absolving the requirement of bilingual
education.
268 The impact on agencies test was established by United States Telephone v. FCC, 28
F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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the agency commits itself to the legal position articulated in its officially
nonbinding guidance. Although the agency's legal position may not receive
the same level of deference as an officially binding rule, the position articu-
lated in the guidance is treated by the agency as if it were legal precedent,
taking on law-like characteristics as a practical matter.26 9 Both the OCR and
EEOC bound themselves to the legal positions taken in their guidances on
national origin discrimination. The OCR continues to cite to the original
1968 memorandum calling for inclusion of language minorities in class-
rooms in its enforcement actions.2 70 The EEOC relies on its revised gui-
dance and on the national origin sections of its compliance manual, which
have maintained the same position on English-only rules in the workplace
and until recently have remained unchanged with regard to the language
dimension of national origin discrimination.2 71
Part IV has credited regulatory agencies, through the issuance of guid-
ances, with protecting civil rights. Guidances served as the vehicle for statu-
tory interpretation and administrative enforcement, critical tasks that
concretized rights implied but not fully realized in statutory form. The les-
sons of history tell us that, as a matter of legal effect, the OCR guidance
articulated rights for language minorities more successfully than did the
EEOC guidances. The Supreme Court enshrined the OCR guidance in case
law and Congress codified the result. This gave weight to the OCR's pro-
phylactic rules and made the regulatory rights of language minorities stick.
This remained true even as the specific remedy of bilingual education eroded
and even as civil rights enforcement premised on Title VI regulations have
come under more recent challenge.2 72 In contrast, the legal effect of the
269 Robert Anthony complained that practically binding guidance is problematic because it
binds the public, even if that binding effect on the public is incidental to binding the agency.
Anthony, supra note 50.
270 See, e.g., William L. Smith, Policy Regarding the Treatment of National Origin Minor-
ity Students Who Are Limited English Proficient, OFFICE OF Civ. RTs. (Apr. 6, 1990), https://
www2.ed.gov/aboutlofficeslist/ocr/docs/laul990_and_1985.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
X2V6-GVPH.
271 National Origin Discrimination, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/national
origin.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/8EVQ-9MN9 (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
272 The viability of the Lau remedies founded on Title VI regulatory policy following
Alexander v. Sandoval is uncertain. In Sandoval, the Supreme Court found no implied private
right of action to enforce Title VI regulations prohibiting laws with a disparate impact on
protected minorities in a case that let stand an Alabama state law limiting driver's license tests
to English. 532 U.S. 275, 291-92 (2001) (limiting section 602 agency authority to enact regu-
lations not tied to statutory rights and restricting enforcement of those regulations to the agen-
cies, as opposed to private individuals). This conclusion was challenged by Rachel Moran in
her article on the "undoing" of Lau, which ultimately concluded that the Lau remedies sur-
vived Sandoval. Rachel Moran, Undone By Law: The Uncertain Legacy of Lau v. Nichols, 16
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 10 (2005) ("Despite recent incursions, the heart of Lau, in particu-
lar, its naming of linguistic exclusion, survives."). In the core of her description of legal
challenges to Lau, she recounts Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission of New York, 463
U.S. 582 (1983), as potentially undercutting Lau's assumption that Title VI addresses both
discriminatory intention and disparate impact. Moran, supra, at 4-6. She then explains that
while Alexander v. Choate, 499 U.S. 287 (1985), permitted disparate impact actions to remain
if premised in regulation (even if not in statute), the 2001 decision Alexander v. Sandoval
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EEOC's regulatory guidance on English-only policies in the workplace
proved vulnerable to judicial challenges such as Garcra v. Gloor from the
outset and never gained traction in other circuit courts - suggesting that the
language rights expressed in the EEOC guidance never achieved indepen-
dent legal effect. Not to be overlooked, both the OCR and EEOC guidances
governed most successfully through practical effect. Agency guidances
from the OCR and EEOC bind their respective agencies to this day in their
compliance standards, investigations, and enforcement actions. So doing,
they influence the practical realities for language minorities in today's
schools and workplaces.
CONCLUSION
What do the lessons of history portend for the modem moment, when
civil rights laws once again seem in need of updating? By the 1980s, the
effort to roll back civil rights targeted regulatory excess as well as the under-
lying social vision of equality. Some might argue that the rollback continues
today. This begs the question whether agency-promulgated rights are a
sound foundation for legal change. Consider first that language rights likely
would not have developed as part of the civil rights movement - or would
not have developed as rapidly and with as little resistance - had they not
taken hold in civil rights agencies. Setting aside the unique political climate
that made policy reform possible in the 1960s, legislators were largely una-
ware of the language gaps that barred non-English speakers from equal op-
portunity. Courts that heard challenges raising these difficulties lacked the
expertise and capacity to respond quickly or effectively without the partner-
ship of the agencies themselves. And social movement pressure among the
newly arrived simply could not have matched the historic struggle of the
black civil rights movement. A regulatory strategy enabled rapid response
to demographic change and a tailored approach sensitive to policy context
and complexity.
Reflecting on 1960s civil rights laws, the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights accurately observed that "[c]ivil rights laws now apply in almost
every area in which the federal government has responsibilities. It is not so
much new laws that are required today as a strengthened capacity to make
pulled the rug out from private enforcement of disparate impact theories of liability precisely
because they are based on regulation rather than statute. Some commentators have suggested
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (permitting a private right of action to any person who, under color of
state law, is deprived "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws") provides an alternative way to enforce Title VI regulations. See, e.g., Bradford Mank,
Using §1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 321 (2001).
Moran disagrees, however, and notes that subsequent section 1983 litigation and efforts to
limit congressional delegation authority under s ection 5 of the Equal Protection Clause further
weaken the possibility of enforcing rights grounded in regulations rather than statutes. She
suggests that the Equal Educational Opportunity Act is a more promising source of legal au-
thority for the Lau precedent. Moran, supra, at 6-10.
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existing laws work."2 73 It was true then, and it is mostly true now. In areas
ranging from voting rights to immigration reform, the nation awaits federal
action. This Article suggests that policy reformers might helpfully shift their
gaze from Congress to regulatory agencies within the executive branch as
the guardians of civil rights. Agencies can reinterpret the promises of civil
rights statutes without needing to directly confront the hurdles of partisan
politics in Congress and they are relatively more insulated from politics than
the White House. In essence, the lesson of language rights emerging on the
fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is that agency guidances
enable the law to keep pace with changing circumstances and assist the
ongoing quest for equal opportunity. Undoubtedly, agencies can do more to
advance civil rights than just promulgating guidance, and other forms of
governance can bring distinct advantages, but we would be left with far less
in the absence of governing by guidance.
273 U.S. COMM'N ON Civi. RIGHTS, TEN YEARS AFTER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACr (1975)
(available at National Archives II, College Park, MD).
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